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**THE ARMISTICES OF
1918**

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The ARMISTICES *of* 1918

SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
K.C.M.G., C.B.

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FOREWORD

THE Royal Institute of International Affairs published in 1920 *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* in five volumes, edited by the late Mr. H. W. Temperley. This work is a fully documented record of the negotiations and procedure which culminated in the Treaties of Peace. Volume I deals at considerable length with the events which led up to the collapse of Germany and with the pre-Armistice negotiations on the German side. Immediately after the war the Germans undertook an inquest into the causes of their defeat, and Mr. Temperley had at his disposal ample material for that side of the story. Similar material was not then available about the pre-Armistice negotiations on the side of the Allies, but this gap has now been to a great extent filled by the memoirs and reminiscences of the protagonists. The most valuable lessons for us are to be found in this part of the story, which is put together in this book. I have summarized the documentary evidence dealing with the pre-Armistice period which is contained in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* and is indispensable in an account of the events preceding the Armistice, and have reproduced *in extenso* those documents emanating from the Allies which have not previously been brought together.

F. MAURICE

CAMBRIDGE

January 1943

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CHAPTER I

THE PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS

THE German offensive campaign in the West which began with the attack on the British Third and Fifth Armies in March 1918 ended with the failure of the attack on the French Fourth and Fifth Armies in Champagne on either side of Reims, which began on 15 July. This failure was followed promptly by an Allied counter-offensive, delivered between Soissons on the Marne against the flank of the great salient which the enemy had created in the attack begun on 27 May across the Chemin des Dames. This counter-offensive won an immediate success and resulted in the extinction of the salient and the driving of the Germans back over the Vesle with heavy loss. The success won by the Germans in the earlier stages of the campaign of 1918 had been impressive. Their attacks on the British Armies in March and April had endangered the security of the Channel Ports and preparations for evacuating them had been begun, while at home plans for the evacuation of non-combatants and supplies from our southern and south-eastern coasts in the event of invasion had been put in hand. They had nearly resulted in the separation of the British and French Armies and produced alarm in France for the security of Paris. These dangers had been hardly mastered when the attack of 27 May brought the Germans once more across the Marne and within striking distance of the French capital. This created as much alarm in France as the spring attacks had caused in England, and in the French Chamber there were demands for the removal of Pétain and outspoken criticisms of Foch.

The moral effect of these grave events in Great Britain and France was more than temporary and was not to be removed by a single unexpected, if very welcome, success.

It is therefore not surprising that no one on the side of the Allies realized that a single field had turned the chance of war and that from 18 July the tide would roll with increasing speed and volume in their favour. Foch's plans at this period were limited to a series of attacks to free the lateral lines of railway behind the Allied fronts, and as late as the middle of September he did not contemplate being able to do more in 1918 than drive the enemy back from the Hindenburg line and be in a position to begin the campaign of 1919 in April in favourable conditions.¹ Foch's counter-stroke had the immediate result of upsetting Ludendorff's plans for 1918. It had been his intention to follow up the offensive in Champagne with

¹ Callwell: *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, vol. ii, pp. 121 and 125.

another attack in Flanders against the British Armies, but the heavy losses which the Germans had suffered in the failure in Champagne and in their complete defeat in the Marne salient had compelled him to abandon the proposed campaign in Flanders and withdraw troops from that part of his front to strengthen his centre. None the less, this was not regarded by the German High Command as more than a temporary set-back, regrettable, but far from irremediable.¹

An Imperial War Council assembled in London on 31 July 1918, and to it the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, presented a long review of the military situation in all theatres of war, dated 25 July—that is, at the time when the success of Foch's counter-attack was assured. In his survey of the position on the Western Front he envisaged five possibilities:—

1. The German offensive may be fought to a standstill before any strategical decision has been obtained, leaving the Allied Armies in effective touch with each other, holding a line from the North Sea to Switzerland, covering the Channel Ports and Paris.

2. The British Army may be forced to abandon the Channel Ports, either—

(a) As the result of a successful attack on the British Front, or—

(b) In order to keep in touch with the French and Americans south of the Somme.

3. The enemy may capture Paris, or bring it under such effective fire as will deny the use of the railway communications through it and stop the working of the extensive munition works which are concentrated in its vicinity.

4. The enemy may effect the complete separation of the British and French Armies, the former being driven back to positions covering the Channel Ports, the latter falling back to the south.

5. The enemy may effect a breach in the line on some part of the front east of Paris, cutting the French Army in two and entailing a return to the conditions of open warfare.

Of these possibilities he considered the first to be the most likely, and he went on:—

If the German advance is stayed without achieving any far-reaching strategical results, the immediate preoccupation of the Allies must be to secure such a margin of safety for our line in France as will remove all anxiety as to our position. This will enable us to devote our efforts uninterruptedly during the ensuing period to preparation for the decisive

¹ Ludendorff: *My War Memories*, vol. ii, p. 674.

phase and, if necessary, to detach troops to other theatres without misgivings..

The most which he believed to be possible on the Western Front in 1918 was that we might improve our position by driving the Germans farther back from the Channel Ports and the Bruay coal-mines, and from Amiens and Paris. He then went on to consider how soon more than this could be achieved. 'The first question that arises is—when is this decisive effort to be made? That is to say, will it be possible to accomplish it in 1919, or must we wait until 1920?' As to this he concludes:— 'I have no hesitation in saying, therefore, that as a basis of calculation, we should fix the culminating period of our supreme military effort on the Western Front not later than 1st July, 1919'; but even then he could not hold out hope of achieving more than substantial military success.¹

With this gloomy survey before them, the Imperial War Council came to the conclusion that the prospect of a decisive victory over the enemy on the Western Front was at best doubtful and that no attempt to obtain such a victory should be made until the summer of 1919, when it was hoped that the strength of the American Army would be greatly increased. It is strange that the Council, before coming to a decision which was intended to govern the plans and preparations of the Mother Country and the Dominions for a year ahead, should not have referred the problem either to the Supreme War Council or to the Generalissimo. Ministers and the General Staff at the War Office having come to this conclusion, it took more than a few victories to shake them out of the conviction that there was no prospect of bringing the war to a satisfactory end in 1918. The war, as wars usually do, brought many surprises and not the least of these was the rapidity with which the enemy collapsed once the tide had turned.

By 4 August Foch's counter-attack had forced the Germans to retire behind the Aisne and the Vesle, and four days later another blow was struck at them. Haig had had in preparation for some time an attack on the Amiens front, to be delivered by his Fourth Army. To this Foch added the First French Army, which he put at Haig's disposal. The result was an outstanding success which changed the whole attitude of German headquarters, and before long of the German people, towards the war. Hindenburg wrote of the battle of Amiens, which was a triumph for the latest type of British tanks:—

I had no doubt about the political effects of our defeat of August 8th. The struggle which took place between July 15th and August 4th might well be regarded, both abroad and at home, as a bold enterprise

¹ A full summary of this memorandum is to be found in *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3110 *et seq.*

which met with misfortune, as happens in every war. The disaster of August 8th was quite evidently the consequence of weaknesses which could not be concealed. It was quite another matter to be beaten in a battle in which we stood on the defensive than to fail in an attack. The captures which our enemies were able to display to the world spoke for themselves.¹

Ludendorff goes into greater detail:—

The report of the staff officer I had sent to the battlefield as to the condition of those divisions which had met the first shock of the attack on the 8th perturbed me deeply. I summoned divisional commanders and officers from the line to Avesnes to discuss events with them in detail. I was told of deeds of glorious valour but also of behaviour which, I openly confess, I should not have thought possible in the German Army; whole bodies of our men had surrendered to single troopers, or isolated squadrons. Retiring troops, meeting a fresh division going bravely into action, had shouted out things like 'Blacklegs' and 'You're prolonging the War', expressions that were to be heard again later. The officers in many places had lost their influence and allowed themselves to be swept along with the rest. At a meeting of Prince Max's War Cabinet in October, Secretary Scheidemann called my attention to a Divisional Report on the occurrences of August 8th, which contained similar unhappy stories. I was not acquainted with this report, but was able to verify it from my own knowledge. A battalion commander from the front, who came out with a draft from home shortly before August 8th, attributed this to the spirit of insubordination and the atmosphere which the men brought back with them from home. Everything I had feared, and of which I had so often given warning, had here, in one place, become a reality. Our war machine was no longer efficient. Our fighting power had suffered, even though the great majority of divisions still fought heroically.

The 8th August put the decline of that fighting power beyond a doubt and in such a situation as regards reserves, I had no hope of finding a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to our advantage. On the contrary, I became convinced that we were now without that safe foundation for the plans of G.H.Q. on which I had hitherto been able to build, at least as far as this is possible in war. Leadership now assumed, as I then stated, the character of an irresponsible game of Chance, a thing I have always considered fatal. The fate of the German people was for me too high a stake. The war must be ended.²

The result of Ludendorff's conclusion was that from the middle of August German Great Headquarters began to press the successive Chancellors to initiate negotiations for peace which would save as

¹ General Field-Marshal von Hindenburg: *Aus Meinem Leben*, p. 362.

² Ludendorff: *My War Memories, 1914-1918*, pp. 683, 684.

much as possible for Germany. As the attacks of the Allies continued with greater and greater success this pressure increased and produced a series of political crises and changes in Germany. The full story of this has been told,¹ and I do not propose to take it up until its developments began to be known to the Allies.

After some discussion with Foch, who was at first in favour of continuing the attack on Amiens, Haig won the Generalissimo's agreement to an extension of the front of battle northwards by bringing in the Third and First British Armies. This decision and the action which resulted from it were the chief factors in the collapse of German resistance on the Western Front. The attack of the Third Army was immediately successful. On 20 August, the day on which this attack was launched, Haig entertained Mr. Winston Churchill at his headquarters and told him that 'we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn'. Mr. Churchill in reply said that the General Staff in London was still of opinion that the decisive period of the war could not arrive before July 1919.²

The Fourth, Third and First British Armies were now engaged in a general offensive campaign and were driving the enemy back into the Hindenburg line, which Haig had made up his mind to attack. But in London there was still little of that confidence which inspired the British Armies, and on 1 September the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to Haig:—

Just a word of caution in regard to incurring heavy losses in attacks on the Hindenburg line as opposed to losses when driving the enemy back to that line. I do not mean to say you have incurred such losses but I know the War Cabinet would become anxious if we received heavy punishment in attacking the Hindenburg line without success.³

There was still no belief at home that Haig was right in supposing that victory in 1918 was possible. The Prime Minister had no confidence in Haig's judgement, and it was not until the Hindenburg line was broken that Foch came to the conclusion that Haig was right and that the Germans should be pressed everywhere and in the greatest possible strength with the object of securing an early decision of the struggle. On 8 September Haig went to England to see Lord Milner and to impress on him that if we acted with energy at once a decision could be obtained in the very near future.⁴ Lord Milner, then Secretary of State for War, agreed with Haig's views,

¹ Temperley: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i.—*Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre*, vol. ii, tome vii.—*Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands*.

² Duff Cooper: *Haig*, vol. ii, p. 353.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

but no action by the Government followed to prepare for the end and no steps of such a kind were taken either in France or in Italy.

This does not mean that no thought had been given to the principles to be followed in a peace settlement or to the terms which the Allies would impose on their enemies, if and when they were victorious.

In fact a great deal of consideration had been given to these matters. On 5 January 1918, Mr. Lloyd George announced the British war aims in a speech the terms of which had been approved not only by his Cabinet but also by the leaders of all political parties. The chief of these aims were set forth in the following terms:—

1. The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. The settlement of the New Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government in the interests of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this hour. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared at whatever sacrifice to honour the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

2. The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their Allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial and economic, of the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made in the devastation of its towns and provinces.

3. Now comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro and the occupied parts of France, Italy and Roumania. The complete withdrawal of the alien Armies and the reparation of injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

4. We mean to stand by the French Democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard for the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and until it is cured, healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right. . . .

The democracy of this country means to stand to the last by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other Allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side with the new democracy of Russia; so with America and so with France and Italy. But, if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their Allies, we have no means of intervening to avert the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people.

We believe however that an independent Poland comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe. 5

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace. 6

On the same grounds we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to insist that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. . . . 7 8

Outside Europe, we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgement entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed. 9 10

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. . . . The natives live in their various vital organizations under Chiefs and Councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is therefore as applicable in these cases as in those of occupied European countries. . . . 11

Finally, there must be reparation for injuries done in violation of international law. The Peace Conference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered us, and the attacks they have suffered for the common cause of freedom. . . . 12

So long as the possibility of dispute between nations continues—that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by passion and ambition, and war is the only means of settling a dispute—all nations must live under the burden, not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak. The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing cost of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation, these are blots on our civilization of which every thinking individual must be ashamed.

For those and other similar reasons, we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish by international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. All war 13

is a relic of barbarism, and just as law has succeeded violence as the means of settling disputes between individuals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply as we have often replied. We are fighting for a just and lasting peace and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for these conditions must be fulfilled: firstly, the sanctity of treaties must be established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination and the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the possibility of war.¹

Three days after Mr. Lloyd George had spoken, President Woodrow Wilson, on 8 January 1918, announced his Fourteen Points of a peace settlement: as these had a direct influence on the negotiations both for the Armistice with Germany and for the treaties of peace it is convenient to have them re-stated here:—

ONE. Open Covenants of Peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

TWO. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

THREE. The removal as far as possible of all economic barriers and the re-establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

FOUR. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

FIVE. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

SIX. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in offering her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and

¹ David Lloyd George: *British War Aims*, pp. 7 *et seq.*

national policy, and assure her a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, and more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need or may herself desire. The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

SEVEN. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act, the whole structure and validity of International Law is for ever impaired.

EIGHT. All French territory should be freed and the invaded positions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

NINE. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

TEN. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

ELEVEN. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated and occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

TWELVE. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

THIRTEEN. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea,

and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

FOURTEEN. A General Association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

A These were the chief statements on war aims which came from the Allied and Associated Powers. Nothing of like importance came from France and Italy. There is clearly a great deal in common in the two statements; indeed it appears as if several of the President's points had been adapted from Mr. Lloyd George's speech, to which the President referred in his preamble in complimentary terms. But there were important differences between the two. No European diplomatist considered it possible to give practical application to the first point. An agreement to abolish secret treaties was one thing, the prohibition of confidential discussions as a preliminary to the conclusion of agreements quite another. As to the second point, which deals with what is usually called the Freedom of the Seas, if it was the intention to abolish blockade as a weapon of war except under international authority, no British Government was likely to accept the point. B Point six, which deals with Russia, went a good deal further than did Mr. Lloyd George and further than the actualities of the situation in that country made practicable. C There was not anywhere in the Fourteen Points such an insistence on the importance of reparation and restitution as the British Prime Minister had put forward. D There were other important differences between the pronouncements of the two statesmen. In a speech on 21 December 1917, President Wilson said:—

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual powers of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government. . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on.

The President declared bluntly that he was unwilling to negotiate with the German Government as then constituted.

At the beginning of his speech of 5 January Mr. Lloyd George said:—

We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are not fighting for. We are not fighting a war of aggression as against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defence as against a league of evil nations bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German peoples has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day. . . . Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination, and to see her devote all her strength to the great beneficent tasks of the world. . . . Nor did we enter this war merely to attack or destroy the imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that in her the old spirit of military domination had indeed died in this war, and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But after all, that is a question for German people to decide.

The British Government was prepared to negotiate with whatever German Government was in power when the end came.

Besides the important pronouncements on war aims, a great deal of work had been done by committees in Great Britain and in France on the drafting of a constitution for the League of Nations. Thus much had been done to prepare the way for peace negotiations and substantial agreement had been reached between the British and American Governments on fundamentals. Both were agreed, as President Wilson put it in his speech of 4 July 1918, that 'What we seek is the sign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind'. But this agreement was not carried to its logical conclusion, and no other attempt was made to resolve the important differences which I have pointed out, and to prepare an agreed Allied statement on our aims. This omission gave the enemy an opportunity for a political manœuvre of which he was not slow to take advantage and gave rise to discussions and delay amongst the Allies which might have been avoided. The reason for this I take to be the same reason as made the Allied Governments slow in seeing that the end was near. The first half of 1918 had been a period of grave danger for the Allies, and both Governments and General Staffs were too much occupied with fending off the danger to consider preparations for peace, with the result that they were taken by surprise and were unprepared. In this matter we have done better in the present war. The war aims of Great Britain and the United States have been drawn up jointly by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States

in what is commonly called 'The Atlantic Charter' and this has been endorsed by twenty-six Allied nations. In the autumn of 1918 it does not seem to have occurred to anyone that before peace negotiations could be begun there would have to be Armistices for the cessation of hostilities and that these would require both political and military preparation, which would be more effective if it was timely. On this matter we must also do better in the present war.

About the middle of September events moved fast. The victorious advance of the British Armies continued. On 12 September the American Army attacked and quickly wiped out the St. Mihiel Salient. On 15 September the Austro-Hungarian Government sent a peace note to President Wilson. As early as the middle of August the Austrian representatives at a conference at German Great Headquarters at Spa had stated bluntly that Austria could not hold out through the winter, and indicated that if nothing was done by Germany Austria would have to act independently. The operative part of the Austrian note ran:—

The Royal and Imperial Government would like, therefore, to propose to the Governments of all belligerent States to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles for the conclusion of peace in a place in a neutral country and at a near date, which would have to be agreed on, the delegates who are appointed to make known to one another the conception of their Governments regarding those principles, to receive analogous communications, and to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.¹

This was clearly a political manœuvre, which would have been impossible if a joint statement of Allied war aims had been prepared. It was obvious that, if a conference of the kind proposed were to be held, the effect on the Allied Armies would be considerable and that the Central Powers might thereby achieve a breathing-space in which to save something from the wreck.

President Wilson saw through the manœuvre and replied on 16 September:—

The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candour stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.²

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3247.

² *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, p. 370.

The issue of this Austrian note was a clear signal that the end was near.

On the same day as the Austrian peace note was issued the Allies began an offensive in Macedonia, which was completely successful. In three days the enemy's third line of defence was broken and by 22 September he was in retreat on the whole front. On 26 September the Bulgarian High Command sent to General Milne, who commanded the British Army in Macedonia, a request for an armistice and he passed on the request to General Franchet d'Esperey, the Allied Commander-in-chief in that theatre of war. The collapse of the Bulgarians had come sooner than the most optimistic had expected.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMISTICES WITH BULGARIA AND TURKEY

WHEN, on 27 September 1918, a telegram from General Milne reached London with the information that the Bulgarians had sent in a flag of truce with a request for an armistice, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff consulted Mr. Bonar Law and Lord Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister being away ill at the time, and it was agreed that an armistice should not be granted, but that accredited representatives should be permitted to come in to discuss matters with the Allies.¹ This was a correct decision as far as it went, for an armistice of the kind proposed by the Bulgarians involved political considerations, since the fate of Bulgaria was obviously linked with that of Turkey; but there were also urgent military problems involved. I suggest that the right course would have been to require the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, at least as soon as the issue of the Austrian peace note gave an indication that other developments of the same kind might follow, to prepare terms of armistice with the belligerents for the consideration of the Council, which should have been ready to assemble promptly. The situation created by the Bulgarian request for an armistice was peculiar, for the Bulgarians held only the eastern half of the front in Macedonia, and the German and Austrian Armies on the other half of the front were not included in the armistice proposals. So when on 26 September, in a car with a white flag, there appeared on the front of the British 16th Corps two Bulgarian officers bearing a letter of request to General Milne for a forty-eight hours' suspension of hostilities, during which delegates would be sent in with proposals for an armistice, General Milne was clear that such a suspension of hostilities was out of the question, and he merely sent the Bulgarian officers to General Franchet d'Esperey at Salonika. On the 27th another car appeared on the British front with a Mr. Walker of the United States Legation in Sofia and a Bulgarian officer. The United States had never declared war on Bulgaria and there was an American chargé d'affaires in Sofia. M. Malinov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, wished to take advantage of this fact to appeal to President Wilson—another example of the consequences of the existence of separate Allied announcements of war aims. The Austrian wireless station, naturally enough, refused to transmit the appeal, and Mr. Walker was sent to endeavour to get General Franchet d'Esperey to send it forward. The French Commander-in-chief informed his Government, and

¹ Callwell: *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, vol. ii, p. 127.

M. Clemenceau instructed him to have no dealings with the American chargé d'affaires; quite rightly, for the delays which reference to Washington would have caused would have prejudiced the military situation.

In Paris, where the authorities were now informed of the situation in Macedonia, General Guillaumat, the French Chief of Staff, and a former Commander-in-chief of the Armies of the East, set about preparing terms of armistice with Bulgaria, which he submitted to M. Clemenceau, who passed them on to Mr. Lloyd George. But Franchet d'Esperey realized that there was no time for diplomatic routine. He wished to take advantage of the situation in which the German and Austrian troops on his front had been left by the collapse of Bulgaria and to drive them back to and over the Danube, so as to carry the war into Hungary. He therefore took matters into his own hands and dictated terms of armistice to Bulgaria which were signed on 30 September. As these terms were designed mainly to facilitate further operations against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces they were comparatively light, the main point being the immediate evacuation of Greek and Serbian territory in Bulgarian occupation, the immediate demobilization of the army, except of a sufficient force to maintain internal order, the surrender of guns and equipment by the demobilized troops, the use of all Bulgarian means of communication by the Allies, and the re-occupation by them of strategic positions in Bulgaria.¹

Franchet d'Esperey was quite right in making it his main purpose to press the chief enemy as hard and as quickly as possible. This was the move most feared at German Great Headquarters, which was even more surprised than the Allies at the rapidity with which the Bulgarian Army had been routed. Ludendorff realized that the door into Hungary had been opened at a time when his armies on the Western Front were breaking up:—

I felt compelled to take on myself the great responsibility of hastening the end of the war, and for this purpose to move the Government to decisive action.²

But it now became apparent that a wider view of the situation created by the collapse of Bulgaria was needed. Franchet d'Esperey wanted to direct the bulk of his forces on to the Danube with the double object of stretching out a hand to Roumania and invading Hungary. He proposed to detach one French and one British division to attack Turkey on his right. But when the question of an advance to the Danube was examined it was found that the rail and road communications through Bulgaria and Serbia, never good, had

¹ For the complete terms of armistice, see Appendix I.

² Ludendorff: *My War Memories*, vol. ii, pp. 715 *et seq.*

been much impaired, bridges had been destroyed, roads damaged, and tunnels blocked. It was certain that this damage would be increased by the enemy as he retreated. An advance to the Danube would therefore be slow, and there was a considerable force of Germans in occupation of that country.

In these circumstances General Milne proposed that the British Army should move through Thrace on Constantinople in co-operation with the British fleet. Allenby's campaign in Palestine, which had opened on 19 September, had resulted in a swift and complete defeat of the Turks, and on 30 September Damascus had been occupied. The surrender of Turkey was in sight, and Milne considered that help could be brought more speedily and effectively to Roumania by getting the British Fleet into the Black Sea than by a long and difficult march through the Balkans to the Danube. He maintained that, if his army were detached for operations against Turkey, Franchet d'Esperey would still have at his disposal as large an army as the lines of communication through Serbia and Bulgaria could support. Milne's views were also influenced by the natural preference of a British general for an operation which would keep him in touch with the fleet to one which would take him into the heart of Europe. Here there was a conflict of view between the French Commander-in-chief and the British Commander. Franchet d'Esperey regarded an advance to the Danube as of prime importance, and a march on Constantinople as a subsidiary which was of no urgency. Milne maintained that the two were at least of equal importance and could be carried out simultaneously.

The mention of Constantinople at once raised political issues, for both France and Italy had interests in that quarter and were suspicious of a proposal for independent British action there. Mr. Lloyd George therefore went to Paris on 5 October to arrive at an agreement with M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando. Foch when consulted gave his views in the form of some brief notes which ran:—

1. Cut the railway lines running from German territory to Constantinople.

At Nish cut part of the lines.

Cut all the lines on the Maritza upstream from Adrianople.

2. Take possession of strategic points in Bulgaria that will ensure the disarmament of the Bulgarian Army.

3. Move an Army Corps to the Danube to cut the enemy's river communications there and if necessary to lend a hand to Roumania;

4. Thereafter, when these conditions are carried out, examine, study, prepare an action against Turkey.¹

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3264.

This was an endorsement of Franchet d'Esperey's plan, and relegated any move against Constantinople to an indefinite future. As soon as the Allied ministers met it was discovered that Franchet d'Esperey had put his plans into operation without reference to his Government. Mr. Lloyd George objected at once and after considerable discussion the following agreement was reached on 7 October:—

The British, French and Italian Governments agree that the immediate action of the Allies for exploiting the situation in the Balkans shall be developed on the following bases:—

1. The section of the Allied Army of the East marching on Constantinople shall be under the immediate command of the British General, who shall himself be under the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief;
2. The section of the Army of the East marching on Constantinople shall consist mainly of British troops, but shall also include French, Italian, Greek and Serbian troops;
3. Reciprocally, some British troops shall take part in the operation in the North.¹

This settled the military problem mainly on the lines of General Milne's plan. The bulk of the British Army was to march on Constantinople, one division only taking part in the march to the Danube, and each of the Allies concerned was to be represented at Constantinople. There remained the naval problem, and this produced a tussle between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. Before leaving London the British Prime Minister had directed the Admiralty and the War Office to prepare conditions for a general armistice with Turkey. On this the First Sea Lord at once said that if a naval armistice were granted to Turkey the first condition in it should be that the Allied fleet should enter the Black Sea. He added that the fleet should be placed under the command of a British admiral in recognition of the fact that the forces operating against Turkey had been overwhelmingly British. From the beginning of the war it had been agreed that the French should be in control of naval operations in the Mediterranean, the British in control of naval operations in other waters. This agreement had been courteously waived by the French during the Dardanelles campaign, and the Allied naval forces had operated in it under British command. Now, however, M. Clemenceau claimed the rights of France under the original agreement, and proposed that the Allied naval forces which were to enter Turkish waters should be under a French admiral. Mr. Lloyd George protested vigorously and a protracted dispute was the result. Before this question was settled events

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3268.

which will be dealt with later drew the attention of the Allied Premiers to Germany. In fact, problems which demanded immediate solution were now crowding on one another, making it difficult to give to any one of them the attention it deserved. All these questions could have been settled more rapidly and more systematically by the Supreme War Council, particularly if the Military Representatives of the Council had been warned in time to prepare solutions. In fact, though the Military Representatives were consulted, there was no meeting of the Council between 4 July and 31 October. The Council had been created primarily to co-ordinate Allied policy and strategy, but after the appointment of Foch as Generalissimo it was little used for that purpose, and the importance of entrusting to it the preparation of the terms of armistice was overlooked.

While the Allied Premiers were sitting in Paris the plans of the Admiralty and the War Office for an armistice with Turkey reached Mr. Lloyd George and were by him submitted to the Allied Premiers. The forces immediately available for the occupation of Turkey consisted of Milne's army in Macedonia and Allenby's in Syria, so their plans naturally provided for the occupation of strategic points in Turkey by British forces. Our Allies had too many interests in Asia Minor to agree to this, and the British draft was altered to provide for the Allied occupation of strategic points, railways and telegraphs in the Ottoman Empire. While these negotiations were in progress news arrived that the Turkish envoys had arrived at Mytilene and requested that they should be taken to Athens, where they proposed to get into touch with the British Minister. This appeared to make the settlement of terms with Turkey a matter of urgency, but it was soon discovered that the Turkish delegates represented only the Governor-General of Smyrna, who was anxious to get British support for a revolution against the Turkish Government, which he proposed to lead. The British Foreign Office therefore instructed our Minister at Athens to inform the delegates that negotiations for an armistice, or for a peace, would only be conducted with properly accredited representatives of the Turkish Government. The Admiralty had sent Admiral Calthorpe, who was senior to the French admiral in the Aegean, to Mudros. He arrived there on 11 October before any decision had been reached in Paris on the naval question, and found that the French naval squadron in those waters was considerably stronger than his own. The Admiralty thereupon decided to reinforce him with three battle-ships. We had thus prepared support for our thesis by sending a senior admiral to the spot and had arranged to provide him with a stronger squadron than the French had in the Aegean. Before Calthorpe reached Mudros the Allied Premiers had agreed on 9 October to refer the naval question to the Military Representatives in the following terms:—

To refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles, with whom should be associated representatives of the American, British, French and Italian Navies, the question of the liaison between the naval and military forces of the Allies in the forthcoming operations against Constantinople, together with the question of the command of the Allied naval forces engaged in these operations.¹

This reference produced no result, for the French Representative insisted that the naval command should be in French hands, while the British Representative was equally firm that the British Admiral should be in charge. Therefore on 15 October Mr. Lloyd George wrote to M. Clemenceau:—

We have taken by far the larger part of the burden of the war against Turkey in the Dardanelles and in Gallipoli, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine. The British Government has agreed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France should be a French General; it has agreed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the Balkans should be a French General. I do not see how I could possibly justify to the people of the British Empire that, at the moment when the final attack upon Turkey was to be delivered, the command of Naval Forces which are overwhelmingly British, in a theatre of war associated with some of the most desperate and heroic fighting by troops from nearly every part of the British Empire, should be handed over to a French Admiral as well.²

Clemenceau was obdurate and he replied on 21 October that if the British had borne the greater part in the fighting against the Turks they had to that extent been compelled to limit the help which they might otherwise have given to France. He said that France was Turkey's principal creditor and that most of the banks and business concerns in Constantinople were French-owned and that France had the greatest interests there. He had agreed that General Milne should command the military operations from the Balkans against Turkey, but he could not agree that the naval operations should also be in British hands. In reply to this Mr. Lloyd George wrote on 25 October:—

The British Government have agreed to a French Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front; they have agreed to a French Commander-in-Chief in the Balkans; they have agreed to a French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Unless it is to be contended that unity of command means that one nation alone among the Allies is to have not only the supreme

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3268.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3310.

but the subordinate command wherever Allied forces are employed on a common enterprise together, I do not understand why it is that you wish to deprive the British of a naval command which they have exercised ever since 1915 in order that a French Admiral may be placed in control of an expedition, three-quarters of which is British in material and personnel. I assure you that insistence on such a view must inevitably imperil the operation of the all-important principle of unity of command in every department of the War, for public opinion will never tolerate the relinquishment by the British of the naval command in a theatre in which the British arms have throughout the war made the heaviest sacrifices, and to which the people, not of Great Britain alone but of Australia, New Zealand and India, have sent so many of their sons to die. I earnestly trust, therefore, that you will see your way to consent to the arrangement whereby the command in the Aegean and of the attack on Constantinople by sea is to remain in the hands of a British Admiral acting under the general direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.¹

Meanwhile several events contributed to ease this dispute. The Turkish Prime Minister resigned and was succeeded by Izzet Pasha. The new Turkish Government released General Townshend, who had been a prisoner of war since the surrender of Kut, and sent him to Admiral Calthorpe at Mudros with a British officer and the aide-de-camp of the new Turkish Minister of Marine. Townshend brought a message from the Turkish Government that it was ready to conclude a separate peace. On this Calthorpe telegraphed:—

The effect of a Fleet under French Command going up to Constantinople would be deplorable, nor could anything be more unpopular with the Greeks in Turkey. General Townshend thinks that the Turks would be willing to send plenipotentiaries now to treat for peace with British representatives and that they would allow the British to take over the Forts of the Dardanelles if they were assured of support against the Germans in Turkey and the Black Sea.²

The British Government thereupon directed Calthorpe to tell the Turkish Government that he was empowered to conclude an armistice and sent him the twenty-four clauses of the terms which had been agreed upon in Paris with the following rider:—

It is necessary for you to bear these conditions in mind, and as far as possible to obtain them if only to enable us to satisfy the French and Italians that we have done our best to proceed on the lines mutually agreed. But in our opinion the first four conditions are of such paramount

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3311.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3312.

importance, and if immediately carried out will so inevitably make us master of the situation, that we do not wish you to jeopardize obtaining them, and obtaining them quickly, by insisting unduly on all or any of the rest, or indeed by raising any particular one of the remaining twenty if you think it might endanger your success in getting the vital four at once.¹

On 24 October Lord Milner had gone to Paris to make another attempt to get M. Clemenceau to yield and with the help of Mr. Lloyd George's letter and the good offices of Admiral de Bon, the French Minister of Marine, who had always been very friendly to us, the question of the British naval command was at last settled. But the difficulties were not yet over, for in making this concession M. Clemenceau never imagined that the conclusion of the armistice would be left in British hands; but we had already instructed Admiral Calthorpe to go ahead, and on 26 October Turkish representatives arrived accredited to Great Britain only. The French Government sent their Senior Admiral in the Aegean, Admiral Armet, to Mudros to associate himself with Calthorpe in the negotiations. On his arrival the French Admiral wrote to Calthorpe that he had been ordered to take part in the negotiations and to agree to nothing which had not been approved by the French Ministry of Marine. To this Calthorpe answered that the Turkish envoys were accredited to Great Britain only, and that to bring in France now and refer everything to Paris would cause delays which might be very prejudicial to Allied interests. The Turkish envoys, on being shown Admiral Armet's letter, declared that they had no wish to treat with any Government except the British. Calthorpe therefore continued to act as the sole representative of the Allies. In this he was justified by the preamble to his instructions from the Admiralty, which ran:

Some weeks ago when it seemed likely that the Turks would approach us with proposals for peace and an armistice, we agreed with France and Italy that, while terms of peace would need long consideration, an armistice might be concluded by any one of the three powers to which the Turkish Government might make advances.

We were then within our rights, but there is no doubt that the exclusion of the French from the negotiations rankled, and it was felt in Paris that we had jumped their claim with a view to dominating Turkey on behalf of British commercial interests.

The first four clauses of the armistice on which Calthorpe was instructed to insist were:—

1. Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and secure access to

¹ See *Official History of the War*, Naval Operations, vol. v, pp. 351 *et seq.*

the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

2. Positions of all minefields, torpedo tubes and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them as required.

3. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

When the negotiations opened the Turkish envoys at once agreed to terms 2, 3 and 4, but there was a prolonged dispute over the first term. The Turks objected vehemently to any occupation of their forts by Greeks and Italians and said that they would rather dismantle them than accept such conditions. On referring the matter to London Calthorpe was authorized to say that the forts of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be occupied only by British and French troops. This and some further concessions which the Admiral made in the other clauses eased the negotiations, and the Armistice was signed on 30 October.¹

That same day Mr. Lloyd George reported to the Allied Conference then sitting in Paris that the Armistice had been concluded. M. Clemenceau at once raised the question of Calthorpe's action in refusing to allow Admiral Armet to be associated with the negotiations, and there followed what Mr. Lloyd George described as 'a certain amount of recrimination', in the course of which he said:—

Except for Great Britain no one had contributed anything more than a handful of black troops to the expedition in Palestine. I was really surprised at the lack of generosity on the part of the French Government. The British had now some 500,000 men on Turkish soil. The British had captured three or four Turkish Armies and had incurred hundreds of thousands of casualties in the war with Turkey. The other Governments had only put in a few nigger policemen to see that we did not steal the Holy Sepulchre! When, however, it came to signing an armistice, all this fuss was made.²

The British case was strong, for there was no doubt that reference back to Paris would have caused delays which from the military point of view were highly undesirable and might have disclosed differences of opinion, of which the Turks would not have been slow

¹ For the terms, see Appendix II.

² *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol vi, p. 3314.

to take advantage; further, the Bulgarians had made their first overtures to the British Commander-in-chief, but in the event Franchet d'Esperey had concluded the Armistice without reference to the British Government. M. Clemenceau accepted the *fait accompli* with a bad grace.

In accordance with the terms of armistice British and French troops occupied the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and, this done, the Allied fleet under Admiral Calthorpe entered the Straits on 12 November and anchored off Constantinople on the next day. On the 14th a British force landed at Constantinople and the first French troops arrived there on the 21st, to be followed by Italian, Greek and Serbian forces. For the next four years the Turkish capital was controlled by an international régime.

Our dispute with the French should have served as a warning that there were difficulties ahead. M. Clemenceau had indicated clearly that French big business was interested in Turkey, and one of the reasons for his opposition to our proposals was that its representatives in the Chamber, who formed an important part of his political supporters, would, he knew, press him hard, if they did not think that he had secured French interests adequately. In fact it was not long before they began to attack him for his failure to do this. Later, when the situation in the Near East became critical and we were on the verge of war with Turkey, France left us in the lurch because French big business hoped to gain more by conciliating the Turks than it could by supporting us.

The terms of the Armistice with Turkey left us with a vast problem. They involved control of an area a great part of which was inhabited by masterless men, extending from the Maritza to the Indian Ocean, from the Caucasus to the Red Sea. The dispute with France and the complicated discussions over the terms of armistice with Germany left little time for consideration of what would be needed to insure that the terms of armistice were effectively implemented, or how what was needed was to be supplied. It is evident from the instructions which were sent to Admiral Calthorpe that the opinion in London was that if we assumed naval control of the Straits and of the Black Sea all else that we wanted could be obtained at our leisure. But naval control had a limited effect in Asia Minor and in Arabia. On the signing of the Armistice with Germany there came an insistent demand for the demobilization of armed forces, which the Allied Governments did not resist, so that the land forces available for control grew weaker and weaker as the need for control grew greater. The general impression in Paris was that the Turks had been so decisively defeated as to compel them to accept such terms of peace as the Allies decided to impose, and that a settlement with Turkey could be left until more urgent problems in Europe had been settled. So the negotiations for a treaty of peace with

Turkey were the last of such negotiations to be taken in hand, and the Treaty of Sèvres was not signed until 10 August 1920.

By then the task of remodelling the Ottoman Empire, already sufficiently complex, had been complicated by important changes in the Allied war aims in the Near East. On 10 January 1917 the Allies had sent a note to President Wilson in reply to a request from him for a definition of their war aims. In this they had said that one of their aims was 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization'.¹ This was probably a diplomatic way of putting the intentions of the Allies to implement the 'Constantinople Agreement' of March 1915, by which Constantinople and the Straits were to be handed over to Russia if the Allies won the war.

But in January 1918 Russia had dropped out and the secret agreement with her had lapsed, so on 5 January of that year Mr. Lloyd George, in announcing British war aims, had said: 'Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace.' Turkey was not to be turned out of Europe and was to hold her possessions in Asia Minor. But in February 1919 M. Venizelos came to Paris and put in a claim for the cession to Greece of the vilayet of Smyrna. Italy objected strongly, as she had claims in that quarter, but in consequence of a dispute over Fiume she withdrew temporarily from the Conference, and in her absence Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and President Wilson invited M. Venizelos to occupy the Smyrna district with Greek troops. This was waving a red flag in front of the wounded Turkish bull and provided Kemal with just the material he wanted for his nationalist campaign. Without in the least realizing what they had done, the peacemakers of Paris, having disposed of the other treaties, turned to that with Turkey in an easy confidence that she would do what she was told to do.

When the Turkish delegates arrived they were found not to be as complaisant as was expected. There had been considerable discussion as to placing Constantinople and the Straits under the mandate of the League of Nations and it was hoped that the United States could be induced to accept the mandate, but this proposal was received coldly, while the prospect of Constantinople being removed from Turkish control aroused so much feeling in the Mohammedan world that the proposal was abandoned. The threat to take their capital from them was, however, held over the Turks as an inducement to them to accept the Treaty of Sèvres.

This treaty was signed on 10 August 1920. By its chief terms the King of the Hejaz became independent and was recognized as the Custodian of the Holy Places, while Turkey was excluded from

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, p. 428.

control of any Arabian States. Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia became independent States under mandate of the League of Nations. The Straits and an area on either side of them were demilitarized, the boundary of Turkey in Europe was drawn at approximately the Chatalza lines. Eastern Thrace up to the Chatalza lines was handed to Greece, but Constantinople was to remain under Turkish rule. Armenia and Kurdistan were to become independent States. Smyrna and the Ionian hinterland were to be under Greek administration for five years, when their ultimate fate was to be settled by plebiscite. There was no difficulty in coercing the Sultan to accept these terms, but Mustapha Kemal refused to accept them. He declared the cession of Eastern Thrace and the vilayet of Smyrna to the Greeks to be a breach of faith, and this could not in fact be reconciled with the statement of war aims by Great Britain and the United States. The hatred of the Turks for the Greeks gave him a weapon of which he made full use; he roused the Turkish Army and established himself in Anatolia with a considerable following. The Allies had not in the Near East sufficient force to enable them to get at him there. They had never had sufficient force available to secure the disarmament of the Turkish Army in accordance with the terms of armistice, nor were there sufficient forces to guard the dumps of arms which had been surrendered. Kemal therefore was enabled to reorganize and re-equip the Army and become aggressive, even before the Treaty of Sèvres was signed. The British Government then provided Greece with a loan, and she was induced to attack the Kemalists, which she did with success, capturing Brusa, the former Turkish capital. But Kemal was not daunted, and early in 1921 he assembled a National Assembly at Angora, which demanded the security of Constantinople and the return of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey. An attempt to patch up an agreement between the Greeks and the Turks at a Conference in London in the spring of 1921 failed, and Kemal's position was strengthened both by the increase in his forces and by his knowledge that Italy and France were not disposed to follow Great Britain in backing up Greece. As Kemal grew stronger the Greeks grew weaker, the troops were war-weary and wanted to get home, and the strain of maintaining a large army at a distance from the mother country proved to be too much for her. In the summer of 1922 Kemal attacked and speedily swept the Greeks out of Asia Minor. Advancing to the Straits, he came in contact with British forces holding the Ismid peninsula and Chanak on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. War was barely averted by an agreement, which was in effect a second armistice, by the terms of which the Turks got back Adrianople and Eastern Thrace, Constantinople was to be evacuated by British troops (our Allies had already left) and the Turks undertook to guarantee the freedom of the Straits.

In November 1922 another attempt was made to conclude a treaty with Turkey at Lausanne, and this involved a protracted dispute which dragged on until 24 July 1923, when at last the treaty was signed and was ratified by Turkey on 23 August, four years and nine months after the signature of the Armistice with Germany. By the Treaty of Lausanne the European frontier of Turkey again became the Maritza with a demilitarized zone on either side of it; demilitarized zones were fixed on either side of the Straits and on the Greek and Turkish islands of the Eastern Aegean, the Smyrna vilayet reverted to Turkey as did Armenia and Kurdistan, but the other territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Sèvres remained. Not very long after, the King of the Hejaz was ousted by Ibn Saud, and when France and Great Britain showed their weakness by acquiescing in Hitler's military occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, Turkey abolished her demilitarized zones and rearmed the forts of the Straits. In return for one of the most complete victories which her arms have won, Great Britain had only a somewhat uneasy rule in Palestine and a doubtful influence over the destinies of Iraq to show. I trace the reason for this state of affairs back to the fact that insufficient consideration was given at the time of the signing of the Armistice with Turkey to the military problems which that Armistice brought with it, and to insufficient military provision to meet these problems. It was of no value to take powers to occupy strategic points, when this was considered advisable, unless troops were available for the purpose; and when the crisis came they were insufficient. The extent of the armament of the Turkish Army was known with approximate accuracy, and the conditions of armistice should have specified the quality of arms to be surrendered and have required that they be handed over in the areas occupied by the Allies. A very important contributory cause to the lack of power when it was needed was the attitude adopted by the British Government and the British people on the signing of the Armistice with Germany, matters which are dealt with in the chapters which follow. It may be said that the settlement with Turkey has, in this event, proved to be fortunate, but it will not be denied that we are as much hampered in the present war as we were in the last by the closing of the Straits against us, and that the blood and treasure which we expended to get them open have been of no avail.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMISTICES WITH AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

WHILE the Allied Premiers were discussing in Paris the situation which had arisen out of the conclusion of an armistice with Bulgaria, the news reached them on 7 October that the new German Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, had approached President Wilson with a request for an armistice. In the last week of September the situation of Germany had become desperate. The victorious advance of the Allies on the Western Front had become general and the British Armies were on the point of breaking through the last defences of what we called the Hindenburg line. This, which the Germans called the Wotan line, ran west of Lille, Douai and St. Quentin to Reims, and consisted of a very formidable series of defences elaborated during a period of nearly two years. Behind this the Germans had begun two other lines, the Hermann line which ran from Ghent through Valenciennes and Le Cateau to the Aisne, and the Antwerp-Meuse line which ran west of Antwerp and Brussels to Mézières and Sedan. Neither of these defensive systems approached the strength of the Hindenburg line, and if this could not stop the progress of the Allies there was not much prospect of holding the others with armies whose spirits were affected by very heavy losses and constant defeat. Added to this, the situation of Austria was hopeless and the collapse of Bulgaria opened the Danube front to an advance of the Allies.

For some time Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been urging the Chancellor to seek peace on the most favourable terms possible, and at the end of September their demands became peremptory and this produced a political crisis. Hertling resigned the Chancellorship and was succeeded by Prince Max of Baden. There is little doubt, in view of what followed, that the object of German Great Headquarters was to save as much of the army as possible with a view to controlling Germany, and with that object in view they wished to place the whole onus of surrender on the politicians. In order to emphasize the vital importance of immediate action, Ludendorff sent one of his staff, Major von dem Busche, to Berlin on 1 October to explain the military situation to the new Chancellor, and the next day he appeared before the party leaders of the Reichstag. He told them that the sustained attacks of the enemy on the whole of the Western Front made the formation of reserves impossible; that the High Command could no longer make good the losses suffered; Germany could continue the war for some time, cause her enemies heavy losses and devastate the country as the army retired, but could

not win the war; this state of affairs had decided Hindenburg and Ludendorff to request His Majesty to end the war in order to spare the German people and their allies greater sacrifices; the German Army was still strong enough to hold the enemy for some months, but every day that passed brought the enemy nearer his goal and made him less disposed to grant terms of peace which Germany could endure. He concluded by saying that there was no time to lose, the situation might get worse any day, and the enemy might discover the weakness of the army, with disastrous consequences. At the same time as an offer of peace was made the country must show a united front and an unshakeable determination to continue the war if the enemy either refused to grant a peace, or proposed to inflict a humiliating peace. In that event the continued resistance of the army would depend upon the spirit shown by the German people.

This declaration made a profound impression on the politicians, but it had not the effect it was designed to produce. It created the belief in the Reichstag that the High Command had lost its nerve, and made the political leaders decide to bring military policy under political control, a decision which was little short of a revolution in German political life. So on 3 October Prince Max became Chancellor as the head of a parliamentary régime. The German Foreign Office had been for some time considering various lines of approach to peace negotiations, and had come to the conclusion that the best would be to President Wilson. In view of this and of continued pressure from the High Command, Prince Max on taking Office addressed the following note to the President:—

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking measures to avoid further bloodshed.

It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8th. The German Government requests the President of the United States to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN,
*Imperial Chancellor.*¹

This note appears to have been signed on the night of 3-4 October. It was sent through Switzerland to Washington, where it arrived on 6 October, and the Allied Premiers in Paris first heard of it the next day. The situation thus created was embarrassing. President Wilson's Fourteen Points had been announced in an address to Congress, but they had never been communicated officially to the

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, p. 448.

Allies, who had made no attempt to come to an agreement with the Government of the United States on them. It would seem to have been a piece of diplomatic pedantry to have ignored so important a statement of policy publicly made. The Germans found no difficulty in taking cognizance of it, but the Allies only began to give it official attention nine months after it was made. The reason for the neglect was probably their absorption in problems which were pressing on them immediately, and their belief that peace was not yet in sight. In view of the fact that the Allied Governments had not been approached officially, M. Clemenceau proposed that no action should be taken. Mr. Lloyd George objected that this would be unwise; he sensed a German attempt to manœuvre us into a difficult position and to commit us to conditions which we had not considered in detail. He was quite right in his view, as Prince Max of Baden has shown:

The Supreme Command had probably no clear idea at first as to the fateful conditions to which the Fourteen Points must in any case commit Germany. They probably saw in Wilson's programme a mere collection of phrases, which a skilful diplomacy would be able to interpret at the conference table in a sense favourable to Germany. I had put them the question whether the Supreme Command were aware that the course they were entering upon might lead to the loss of colonies and even of German soil—in particular of Alsace-Lorraine and of the purely Polish districts of our Eastern Provinces. I received from them the evasive reply: 'The Supreme Command is ready to consider the cession of some small French-speaking parts of Alsace-Lorraine, if that is unavoidable. The cession of German territory on the Eastern Frontier is for them out of the question.' At the last moment the Supreme Command tried to give expression to this mental reservation of theirs in the wording which they proposed for our note: 'The German Government agrees that Wilson's Fourteen Points shall serve as the basis of conversations.'¹ But the Ministers were—from their point of view rightly—of the opinion that no formula should be used which would make Wilson suspicious and might provoke inconvenient questions. They supposed that they had avoided this in the final wording of the note: as it afterwards appeared, they underrated the alertness of our opponents.²

Mr. Lloyd George was the opponent of Germany who was most alert. He feared that the Allies would be jockeyed into a position in which they might be forced to accept an armistice on the basis of the vague generalities announced in President Wilson's statement of war aims. He therefore proposed that the Allies should settle amongst themselves the general principles on which they were prepared to

¹ The German High Command clearly hoped to obtain such conditions as would enable it to resume the struggle if it did not like the terms of peace.

² *Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden*, vol. ii, p. 24.

grant armistices both to Austria and to Germany and be prepared to confront the President with these should he attempt to modify them. This was agreed, and the military and naval representatives at Versailles were ordered to prepare terms of armistice with the two countries on the following basis:—

- ✓ 1. The total evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.
- ✓ 2. The Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.
- ✓ 3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies.
- ✓ 4. The same conditions to apply to the Trentino and Istria.
- ✓ 5. Serbia and Montenegro to be evacuated by the enemy.
- ✓ 6. Evacuation of the Caucasus.
- ✓ 7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war.
- ✓ 8. Immediate cessation of submarine warfare and continuation of Allied blockade.¹

These principles provided a general guide in the preparation of military terms, but they were very vague as to the naval terms, and were in other respects incomplete.

On 8 October President Wilson replied to the German Government through his Secretary of State to the effect that before approaching the Powers with which the United States was associated he must know whether the Government accepted the terms announced in his addresses to Congress and whether it only remained to consider the details of their application. Nor could he approach these Powers while the Central Powers were in occupation of their soil. The President also inquired whether the Chancellor spoke merely on behalf of the authorities of his Empire which had so far conducted the war. A clear hint that he did not welcome negotiations with the Hohenzollern régime.

On 8 October, too, Foch on his own initiative sent to Clemenceau his proposals for an armistice:—

There can be no question of a suspension of hostilities by the armies operating in France and Belgium until:—

- 1. The territories of Belgium, France and Alsace-Lorraine invaded contrary to all right have been liberated and their populations brought back.

The enemy should therefore be required to evacuate the territory within fifteen days and to repatriate this population.

¹ *Official History of the War, Naval Operations*, vol. v, p. 364.

2. A suitable military base of departure has been assured, which would allow us to continue the war until the enemy's power is destroyed, in the event of the negotiations for peace falling through.

For this base we must have two or three bridge-heads across the Rhine, within the same period of fifteen days, about Rastadt, Strasbourg and Neuf-Brisach (a bridge-head should comprise a semi-circle on the right bank with a radius of thirty kilometres and the end of the bridge on the right bank as centre).

3. Guarantees have been obtained for the reparation of the destruction committed in Allied territory, the demand for which will be presented during the negotiations for the treaty of peace.

For this the enemy should be required to remove his troops from the country on the left bank of the Rhine within thirty days, and this country should be occupied and administered by Allied troops in co-operation with the local authorities until the treaty of peace is signed. The following supplementary conditions should also be imposed :

4. All material and supplies which cannot be removed within the given time must be left where they are and must not be destroyed.

5. Enemy formations which have not evacuated the prescribed territories within the time stated will be disarmed and made prisoners of war.

6. Rolling stock and the permanent way of railways are not to be removed or destroyed. All French and Belgian railway material which has been seized will be restored, or its numerical equivalent.

7. All military installations, camps, barracks, arsenals, are to be left intact, their removal or destruction is prohibited.

8. The same conditions should apply to industrial establishments of all kinds.

9. Hostilities will cease six hours after the day on which the conditions of the Armistice have been approved by the contracting parties.¹

The military representatives of the Supreme War Council proposed that all German troops should be required to fall back behind the Rhine, that only five per cent of their troops should be permitted to keep their arms, and that all other war material should be left intact. The naval terms were less drastic. There were no naval representatives at Versailles in a position corresponding to that of the military representatives, an inconvenient arrangement. The Allied Naval Council had their seat in London and were represented at Versailles by a naval liaison committee, but there was not time for this committee to consult its council, as the Allied Premiers required an immediate reply. The naval terms proposed were:—

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 14.

- (1) The withdrawal of the enemy's entire surface fleet to naval bases chosen by the Allies.
- (2) A similar withdrawal of all naval air forces.
- (3) Submarine warfare against merchant shipping to cease at once and sixty German submarines to be surrendered at Allied ports.
- (4) The blockade of Germany to be continued.

These terms, together with the reply of the American Secretary of State to Prince Max, were considered by the Allied Premiers on 9 October. Their general impression was that the terms were too severe and that Germany would continue to fight rather than accept them. They did not realize that there was a fundamental difference between proposals for peace on terms acceptable to her, such as she had put forward in the past, and a request for an armistice. A great power such as Germany was unlikely to ask for an armistice at the end of a long and bitter struggle unless her position was desperate. Foch saw this clearly, but the Premiers were more than doubtful, and left a decision on the naval and military terms for further consideration. The reply of the American Government to Prince Max of Baden did not remove the doubts of the Ministers. The State Department of Washington had not been tactful and there was resentment that President Wilson should have imposed conditions preliminary to an armistice without first consulting the Associated Powers. This resentment was increased by the fact that the reply of the State Department was published in the Press before it reached the Premiers. There were fears that the President intended to keep the negotiations in his own hands and that the Allies would find themselves committed to the Fourteen Points, on which they desired to make important reservations.

On these grounds, it was agreed, at the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George, to send a note to the President pointing out that, while the Allies agreed on requiring the evacuation by the enemy of occupied territory as a preliminary to any discussion of terms of armistice, such a condition would not suffice. It would not prevent the enemy from taking advantage of a suspension of hostilities to improve his military position, should the armistice expire before peace was signed. He would have an opportunity of withdrawing from a critical situation, of saving his war material, of reorganizing his troops, shortening his front, and retiring without loss on to new positions which he would have time to choose and fortify. It was also agreed that the present triangular negotiations between Berlin, Washington and Paris were highly unsatisfactory, and the President was asked to appoint a plenipotentiary to represent him in conference with the Allies.

Having done as much as was possible, pending a definite understanding with President Wilson, the Allied Premiers separated. Mr. Lloyd George returned to London and met the Imperial War Cabinet, to which he explained his anxieties as to the way in which the negotiations were drifting, and it was decided that the armistice terms should approximate as closely as possible to the terms which would be imposed in the peace treaties. The First Sea Lord who attended this meeting pointed out that this decision affected vitally the naval terms of armistice, that a normal naval armistice would require the withdrawal of enemy war ships from the seas, but if the armistice terms were to be approximately those of the peace treaty then it would be necessary to determine our post-war naval relations with Germany, to fix the number and types of war vessels Germany was to be allowed to maintain, and to require the surrender of the rest. The next day Mr. Lloyd George met his military and naval advisers and decided to send a telegram to President Wilson pointing out that an armistice was not a peace and that if the terms of armistice did not make it certain that Germany would be unable to renew the struggle the positions of the Allies would be jeopardized.

On 12 October the German Government replied to the American note of the 8th accepting the principles of the Fourteen Points and agreeing that it only remained to consider the details of their application. It accepted the condition that occupied territory should be evacuated and proposed a mixed commission to regulate this. It stated that the German peace proposals were agreed to by a large majority of the Reichstag and added that the German Government assumed that the Powers associated with the United States accepted the position taken up by President Wilson in his public declarations. This last statement makes it clear that one of the German objects was to tie the Allies to the Fourteen Points, as Mr. Lloyd George had suspected. Happily the warning which the Allies sent to the President had effect, and on 14 October the State Department answered that it must be clearly understood that the methods of evacuation of the occupied territories and the conditions of the Armistice were matters to be left to the military advisers of the United States and of the Allied Governments. The note went on to say that the Government of the United States could not accept any arrangement which did not provide complete guarantees that the military superiority of the armies of the United States and of the Allies was fully maintained. It added that the President, and he was sure also the Governments of the Allies, would not consider an armistice so long as the German armed forces persisted in illegal and inhuman practices.

During their retirement through France and Belgium the Germans were devastating the country and removing the inhabitants, and since the negotiations had opened they had sunk a passenger steamer

with heavy loss of life and had torpedoed the Irish mail boat *Leinster* without warning, the majority of passengers and crew being drowned. These acts had aroused great indignation on both sides of the Atlantic, and furnished a striking example of German blundering in negotiations in which they were endeavouring to obtain the most favourable terms for themselves. This latest American note did much to clear the air, but it did not entirely satisfy Marshal Foch, and there followed some interesting correspondence between him and his Government on the respective responsibility of statesmen and soldiers in making terms of armistice. On 16 October Foch sent the following note to Clemenceau:—¹

In my letter of October 8th I had the honour of informing you of the principal conditions on which we could consider a suspension of hostilities at that time.

The first and second conditions in the letter referred to are those imposed by military exigencies. In his reply of October 14th to the German proposals President Wilson states that the conditions of the Armistice should be determined by the 'military advisers of the Governments'.

This expression, military advisers, already frequently used in the course of the previous conversations, is ambiguous and requires precision. In fact, the only military advisers qualified to deal with the terms of an armistice are the Commanders-in-chief. They alone are responsible to their Governments for the security of their armies and for the conditions in which hostilities would be resumed if the Armistice were suspended. They alone are acquainted with the condition of their armies and of the attitude of the enemy opposed to them.

As far as concerns the theatre of war in France and Belgium, I consider that the Marshal Commanding-in-chief of the Allied Armies, after consultation with the Commanders-in-chief of the French, British and American Armies and with the Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, is the Military Adviser of the Government.

The third condition considers the guarantees necessary to assure reparation for the destruction perpetrated in Allied territory, the demand for which will be presented during the negotiations for the treaty of peace. This guarantee consists in the occupation of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which is to be evacuated by the enemy's troops within a given period and to be administered by the Allied troops in co-operation with the local authorities up to the time of the signing of the treaty of peace. Will these guarantees suffice to secure the reparations demanded by France and by her Allies, particularly Belgium?

If the answer is 'yes', what is to be the fate of this territory when reparation has been made? Will our occupation be continued or modified?

¹ For this and the subsequent correspondence, see Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, pp. 26 *et seq.*

Shall we annex all or a part of this territory, or shall we endeavour to create autonomous independent neutral States, forming a buffer? Ought the Armistice to reserve the question of the future of this territory now?

These are questions on which the High Command, which will have to sign the Armistice and to discuss the conditions when they are presented, should be informed after preliminary discussions with the Governments. For it is certain that the Armistice must furnish us with guarantees which will assure us, during the course of the peace negotiations, that the conditions which we desire to impose will be obtained, and it is evident that the only sure guarantees will be those advantages obtained by the Armistice; that the sacrifices, in the matter of territory, to which the enemy agrees in concluding the Armistice, will alone be definitive.

In these circumstances it seems to me to be necessary that I should be in close and direct association with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose task it will be to keep me informed of your views on these matters and of those of the Allied Governments. It will then be possible for me to consider the conditions of an Armistice, which will assure the necessary military and diplomatic guarantees, to bring these conditions into accord with the military situation of the moment, and to be in this way always ready to meet without delay my responsibilities not only to the French Government but to those Governments which have entrusted me with the Command of their armies.

If you agree with these views I ask you to be good enough to let me know the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with whom I should collaborate.

Before Clemenceau's answer reached Foch, Haig had an interview with the French Premier. Foch was aware that Haig's views as to the terms of an armistice with Germany differed materially from his own. He therefore wrote to Clemenceau again on 18 October:—

You saw Marshal Haig on Sunday last, and perhaps he spoke to you about the terms of our Armistice. In any case I have to-day received the following information as to his views: Marshal Haig considers the military power of Germany to be still sufficiently strong to be taken seriously into account. He further considers that the approach of bad weather makes it possible for the enemy to undertake such delaying action as will allow him to regroup his forces on a shorter front, and to check the pursuit of the Allies with the help of the weather and of the destruction which he carries out, to an extent which will enable him, with the help of a dictatorial Government, to defend German soil; in short to continue the war for an indefinite period. Such a manœuvre would be prevented by an armistice which would put an end to the war at once by imposing on the enemy only such conditions as are strictly necessary; namely, evacuation of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine. Marshal Haig considers these conditions sufficient to allow of a simultaneous invasion of North and South Germany if the Armistice is broken off.

I cannot agree with this timid view.

1. The military power of Germany is in fact so disorganized morally and materially as to be unable to put up a serious resistance if it is allowed no respite, whatever the form of its Government may be.

2. The mere evacuation of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsace-Lorraine will not provide us with any guarantee of obtaining the reparations we need, and if the Armistice were to be broken, it would not provide us with the means of breaking the enemy's resistance behind the Rhine, over which it would not provide us with any bridge.

In informing you at once of Marshal Haig's views, with which perhaps you are already acquainted, I have the honour to inform you that on this question I adhere to the views expressed in my letter of the 8th of this month.

F. FOCH.

To these two letters M. Clemenceau replied on 23 October:—

I agree with you as to the principles on which consultation with the 'military advisers' of the Allied Governments to determine the conditions of the Armistice should take place. The expression 'military advisers' indicates clearly that it is a question of purely technical consultations. Such consultations must be submitted to the final decision of the Allied Governments, which are free to apply them as they think fit.

As you say very truly, the Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies and the Commanders-in-chief of the French, British, American, Italian and Belgian Armies are responsible to their Governments for the security of their armies and for the conditions under which hostilities will be resumed, should the Armistice be broken off. When military advice has been formulated it is the business of Governments to come to definite decisions. Military advice is required not only as far as concerns the armies but also the fleets.

As you justly remark, military advice should also be sought as to the guarantees for the observance of the Armistice for the payment of the reparations to be demanded when that question arises. It must however be observed that these guarantees may give rise to discussions on diplomatic and economic questions which are not within the province of the military advisers.

As to the question of knowing what changes may be made in these guarantees in the treaty of peace, this can only be of interest to the military advisers if and when military problems should then arise. You will, I am sure, not contest the truth of this observation, which seems to me to be an answer to your concern for joint diplomatic-military action, not only at the time of the Armistice, but also during the peace negotiations.

In order to arrive at a guiding policy on these matters I have consulted the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has replied in the attached letter, which represents the policy of the Government.

There is therefore no occasion to provide you with a collaborator from the Foreign Office. All the information which you desire from the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be immediately provided, and such matters will be much better dealt with by the Minister than by one of his subordinates.

In these circumstances I do not think it necessary to answer your questions as to the personal views of Marshal Haig. Your letter of the 8th October remains in force, and you are certain to be called upon to give your advice when we are ready to formulate our Armistice conditions.

It may even happen that we shall have to consider taking certain decisions which are not mentioned in this document.

CLEMENCEAU.

The attached letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs ran: —

21 October 1918

You have been good enough to communicate to me a letter, which Marshal Foch addressed to you on October 16, in which he asks me, in view of the inevitable repercussion of an armistice on the conditions of peace, that he should be placed in a position to know at any time the views of the Government and of the Allied Governments on these questions.

He is of opinion that he ought to be in close collaboration with an important official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I recognize the connexion between the terms of an armistice and those of a peace which will follow it. It is incontestable that the former should in a large measure affect the latter and that the guarantees necessary to secure peace should find their base in the clauses of the Armistice.

It is therefore natural that Marshal Foch, as Commander-in-chief of the Allied armies on the Western Front, should desire to be kept informed of the views of the Government, concerning the conclusion of the war. But these views cannot be communicated to him by a member of my department, however highly placed he may be in the diplomatic personnel. They must depend on the decisions of the Government, which alone has the authority to take them and to formulate them. The Foreign Minister is required by his office to consider the diplomatic guarantees which should be included in the terms of the Armistice and in the terms of the treaty of peace. He submits his proposals to his Government, which decides.

The responsibility of the Commander-in-chief of the Allied armies either to the French Government or to those of the Allies cannot be extended to include these questions.

Any other conception of the role of the military authority in the preparation of the terms of an Armistice or of a peace treaty could only lead to confusion of responsibilities and only have the result of complicating a situation in which the functions of each authority concerned should be clearly defined, if the final decisions are to be methodical and clear.

These principles are not in contradiction with the legitimate preoccupation of Marshal Foch to be kept informed of diplomatic developments so that he may not find himself out of touch with the general views of the Governments whose armies he commands.

It is your function to keep him informed as you consider desirable.

PICHON.

These two letters from MM. Clemenceau and Pichon put clearly the respective responsibilities of statesmen and soldiers in such a matter as the Armistice with Germany. Armistices may be of several kinds, a temporary suspension of hostilities to bury the dead lying between opposing armies, or a negotiation for the surrender of a besieged town or fortress. These are clearly military questions which do not call for political intervention. Again, in such a situation as arose in Macedonia, when the Bulgarians holding a part only of the front wished to surrender, immediate action was militarily urgent and Franchet d'Esperey was right in concluding an armistice without reference to the Allied Governments. But Germany's appeal to President Wilson raised an issue of a very different scale and one involving political problems of the first importance. The Allied Governments had therefore in this case to decide:

1. Whether the German proposal for an armistice should be accepted.
2. The principles on which the terms of armistice should be prepared.

As to the first of these decisions there was no doubt in the minds of the statesmen, the Commanders-in-chief—with the exception of General Pershing, who wished to continue fighting until the German army surrendered unconditionally—or the Allied military representatives of the Supreme War Council. It was their unanimous opinion that if satisfactory conditions of armistice could be obtained there was no justification for continuing the struggle. This decision has been very generally criticized. It has been maintained that we ought to have continued the war and invaded Germany in order to bring the full realization of the extent of their defeat home to the German people. It is an easy criticism to make, when memories of the conditions of November 1918 have grown dim and when there is full knowledge of the internal condition of Germany, which was not available to the Allies at the time. In fact the Allies, with the exception of the United States, were only less war-weary than the Central Powers. Their armies had advanced victoriously on the whole Western Front, but owing to the systematic and extensive destruction of all lines of communication, which the enemy had perpetrated in his retreat, they had reached the limit at which they could be

supplied. It would have been necessary to call a halt to restore the roads and railways, and this would have given the Germans a breathing-space in which to re-form their armies and shorten their front and prepare new lines of defence. It is true that Foch had a new offensive ready to be delivered in Lorraine on a front of thirty-five kilometres by fourteen French and six American divisions, and the critics argue that this would have provided the *coup de grâce*. As to this Foch himself said, after reviewing the prospects of this attack and the steps which the enemy had taken to meet it:—

All this means that it would have been wrong to expect a decisive result from the offensive of November 14th, a marked change in the course of events. It would have been simply an extension of the operations in progress and, by extending them on the same general lines, would have contributed to the effect of our victory. We desired to complete the results of that victory by gaining possession of the base, which the enemy might use to bring about a change in the fortune of war, a base which would provide him with a centre of reorganization and resistance—the Rhine. Our object was to secure the military occupation. Behind that river, a Germany roused to defend her soil could have reunited and reorganized her defeated armies in order to resume the struggle or at the least extend its duration. Once that river was crossed by our armies Germany was completely at the mercy of the victor. Such then was the goal to be reached by our armies. With the Rhine in our hands the victory would be definitely consolidated and our Governments would be in a position to impose such terms of peace as it considered desirable.

In the first days of November the High Command had for other reasons decided not to stop the advance of the Allied Armies until control of the Rhine was obtained, as the necessary and sufficient military condition for establishing a satisfactory peace. For this reason occupation of the Rhine was proposed as the first clause of the Armistice. Some timid spirits amongst us considered that this condition was exorbitant and had been proposed in order to make Germany reject the Armistice.

Without entering into a discussion of the chances of this happening, this condition seemed to us to be the only one which could consolidate the victories we had been winning for months past on a solid basis, on which peace could be prepared.¹

If the occupation of the Rhine could be secured without further fighting there was no justification in fighting to get it. A prolongation of the war would have involved further heavy sacrifices of life and the devastation of all those parts of Belgium and north-eastern France which remained in the occupation of the enemy.

Most of those who maintain that the Armistice was premature do so because the fable that the German Armies had not been

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, pp. 106 et seq.

defeated and that the real cause of Germany's collapse was what became known as 'the stab-in-the-back'—the machinations of Socialists, Communists, Jews—became generally popular in Germany, and was eventually one of the first planks in the Nazi platform. It was highly important that the reality of the defeat of Germany should be brought home to the German people. Speaking in Manchester on 13 September 1919, Mr. Lloyd George said:—

The first indispensable condition, in my judgement, is that civilization shall establish beyond doubt its power to enforce its decrees. . . . Prussian military power must not only be beaten, but Germany herself must know that. The German people must know that if their rulers outrage the laws of humanity, Prussian military strength cannot protect them from punishment. There is no right you can establish, national or international, unless you establish the fact that the man who breaks the law will meet inevitable punishment. Unless this is accomplished, the loss, the suffering, and the burdens of this war will have been in vain.¹

It is probable that in saying this Mr. Lloyd George had in mind the trial of the Kaiser, of which he became a strong advocate; but the principle which he here stated, that the German people must be made to know that Prussian military power was beaten, could have been applied without bringing the Kaiser into Court and without refusing Germany's application for an Armistice, as will appear. The Allied Premiers had drawn up the principles which should govern the terms of the Armistice on 7 October, when they had many other preoccupations. These principles were, as I have pointed out, vague as to the naval terms, and, as Foch pointed out, did not provide guarantees for reparation. Both these omissions were subsequently corrected, but no consideration was given to the question whether the terms of armistice were such as to make it clear to the German people that their armies had been decisively defeated.

Meanwhile the German Government after prolonged discussion had replied on 20 October to the American note of the 14th. In the course of debate the German Government accused the High Command of attempting to shift the responsibility of the Armistice, and maintained that the collapse of the armies had been the cause of civilian depression. It was proposed to consult other generals than Ludendorff and Hindenburg, but this proposal was withdrawn when they declared that if this were done they would resign. Ludendorff came to Berlin and, after another wrangle as to whether the army had been demoralized by the home front, or the home front demoralized by the defeats of the army, he admitted that the line might be broken and defeat might come any day. But he maintained that if President Wilson stood by the note of the 14th he should be

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3251.

told to fight for his conditions and asserted that no worse terms could be presented. In view of Ludendorff's self-contradictions and of further bad news from the front, the Chancellor decided to ignore the High Command and to reply accepting the President's conditions.

The British Army with the 2nd American Corps had on 17 October begun an assault on the Hermann line, the last of the German defensive systems which had been seriously prepared, and by 20 October had broken through it. This removed the Chancellor's last doubts, and the German note, which was signed by the Foreign Minister, accepted the President's proposals for the evacuation of occupied territory and agreed to the terms of armistice being left to the judgement of the military advisers. It stated that orders had been issued to stop attacks on passenger ships and ended by saying that the new German Government had been completely democratized. In fact the Reichstag met on 22 October and established the responsibility of government to Parliament. The High Command was brushed aside.

On 18 October Haig, after his interview with Clemenceau, came to London at the request of Mr. Lloyd George to give him his views on the Armistice terms. Haig's own account of this interview is:—

The Prime Minister asked my views on the terms which we should offer the enemy if he asked for an armistice. I replied that they must greatly depend on the answers we gave to two questions:

(1) Is Germany now so beaten that she will accept whatever terms the Allies may offer, i.e. unconditional surrender?

If she refuses to agree to our terms:

(2) Can the Allies continue to press the enemy sufficiently vigorously during the coming winter months as to cause him to withdraw so quickly that he cannot destroy the railways, road, etc.?

The answer to both is in the negative. The German Army is capable of retiring to its own frontier, and holding that line if there should be any attempt to touch the *honour* of the German people and make them fight with the courage of despair.

The situation of the allied armies is as follows:

French Army. Worn out, and has not been really fighting latterly. It has been freely said that the 'war is over' and 'we don't wish to lose our lives now that peace is in sight'.

American Army. Is not yet organized. It is ill equipped, half trained, with insufficient supply services. Experienced officers and N.C.O.s are lacking.

British Army. Was never more efficient than it is to-day, but it has

fought hard, and it lacks reinforcements. With diminishing effectives morale is bound to suffer.

The French and American Armies are not capable of making a serious offensive *now*. The British alone might bring the enemy to his knees. But why expend more British lives? and for what?

In the coming winter, the enemy will have some months for recuperation and absorption of 1920 class, untouched as yet. He will be in a position to destroy all his communications before he falls back. This will mean serious delay to our advance if war goes on to next year.

I therefore recommend that the terms of armistice should be:

- (1) Immediate evacuation of Belgium and occupied French territory.
- (2) Metz and Strasbourg to be at once occupied by the allied armies and Alsace Lorraine to be vacated by the enemy.
- (3) Belgian and French rolling stock to be returned and inhabitants restored.¹

Haig's views were governed by his experience of the fighting on his own front. The Germans had resisted stoutly in defence of the Hermann line, and he was becoming anxious as to the possibility of keeping his army on the move owing to the difficulties of supply created by the very complete destruction by the enemy of roads and railways as he retired. He did not take sufficiently into account the effect on the Germans of the opening of the Danube front by the Armistice with Bulgaria, an opening which the imminent collapse of Austria would widen further, and he had little information as to the internal condition of Germany.

Meanwhile the general advance of the Allied Armies on the Western Front continued to drive back the enemy and to inflict on him heavy losses. Foch, therefore, still with his eyes on the Rhine as the immediate objective, as soon as he heard that the British Army had broken through the Hermann line sent a note to M. Clemenceau which ran:—

Since the beginning of October, our successes having been continued and extended without pause, the Allied Armies have been advancing victoriously in the direction of Berlin. It is therefore necessary to reconsider and reshape the conditions of the Armistice which I presented on October 8th. The objective of our armies on the Rhine must no longer be Neuf-Brisach, Strasbourg, and Rastadt, but Mayence, Coblenz and Cologne.²

Between the views of Haig and Foch there were obvious differences which needed adjustment.

¹ Duff Cooper: *Haig*, vol. ii, pp. 395 *et seq.*

² Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 51.

On 23 October the State Department at Washington replied to the German note of 20 October. This reply stated that the President, having received the solemn assurance of the German Government that it accepted the terms of peace which he had announced in his addresses to Congress, the assurance that the existing German Government was composed of Ministers who represented the majority of the Reichstag and the German people, and the assurance that the German Government would observe the humane rules of civilized warfare on land and sea, felt that he could not decline to take up with the Governments with which the United States was associated the question of an armistice.

The note went on to say that the only armistice which the President would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which would leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements into which they entered and make it impossible for Germany to renew hostilities. The note ended by stating that the President had transmitted the correspondence between the United States and Germany to the Powers with which the Government of the United States was associated

with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from a military point of view.¹

This note cleared the air, and the Allied Powers, being now informed officially of the negotiations between the United States and Germany, were in a position to put their proposals for an armistice into final shape, a task which was made easier by the fact that the President had appointed Colonel House to be his Plenipotentiary in consultation with the Allied Premiers. The note had produced another crisis in Germany. The High Command protested vigorously against the acceptance of Wilson's terms and declared that it would go on fighting, but when questioned could hold out no hope of an improvement in the military situation. In order to make it clear to his armies that he dissociated himself completely from the negotiations for an armistice which the High Command had insistently and consistently demanded, Hindenburg on 24 October issued the following General Order:—

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, p. 455.

Wilson says in his reply that he is going to propose to his Allies that negotiations for an Armistice should be begun. But the object of this Armistice is to render Germany militarily incapable of resuming the struggle. He is only prepared to negotiate with Germany, if she will yield completely to the demands of the Allies for changes in the internal constitution; short of this the only course is to surrender unconditionally.

Wilson's reply demands a military capitulation and is therefore unacceptable to us soldiers. It is a proof that the desire of our enemies to destroy us, which was the object of the war in 1914, still persists in its entirety. It also proves that our enemies use the term 'peace of Justice' only to deceive us and to break our will to resist. Wilson's reply can then only be for us soldiers a call to continue the struggle to the extreme limit of our power. When our enemies discover that in spite of all their sacrifices they are unable to break our front, they will be ready to conclude a peace which will assure the future of Germany in the interest of the great majority of the population.

HINDENBURG.¹

Ludendorff endorsed this protest and tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Emperor on 27 October. On the same day as Hindenburg issued his order Freiherr von Lersner, who was the Chancellor's representative at headquarters, telephoned to Prince Max of Baden:—

The High Command is furious, but in view of my long experience with it, I must, with the utmost emphasis, put you on your guard against putting any trust in its promises and must recommend you not to allow yourself to be turned aside from the peace proposals which are in view. The military situation is as bad as it was three weeks ago. An improvement is not to be expected and the invasion of our territory is only a question of weeks or at most of a few months.²

The German Government decided to ignore the Generals and to proceed with the negotiations for an armistice.

Before the Allied Premiers could meet to make their final decisions certain preliminaries were still necessary. On 25 October Foch, at Clemenceau's suggestion, held a meeting at his headquarters of the Commanders-in-chief of the armies on the Western Front to discuss the terms of armistice. Admiral de Bon attended to represent the French Navy, but, as another example of the odd way in which some of these conferences were arranged during the war, there was no representative of the British Navy. Haig was the first of the Commanders-in-chief to give his opinion, and he repeated the statement he had made to Mr. Lloyd George. On this Foch remarked:—

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

It cannot be said that the German Army is not defeated. Although we are not able to tell the exact condition, still we are dealing with an army that has been pounded every day for three months, an army that is now losing on a front of 400 kilometres, that, since July 15th, has lost more than 250,000 prisoners and 4,000 guns; an army that is, physically and morally, thoroughly beaten. Certainly, the Allied Armies are not new, but victorious armies are never fresh. In this matter the question is relative; the German armies are far more exhausted than ours. Certainly the British and French Armies are tired; certainly the American Army is a young army, but it is full of idealism and strength and ardour. It has already won victories and is now on the eve of another victory; and nothing gives wings to an army like victory. When one hunts a wild beast and finally comes upon him at bay, one then faces greater danger, but it is not the time to stop, it is time to redouble one's blows without paying any attention to those he himself receives.¹

General Pétain's proposals for terms of armistice were practically identical with those put forward by Foch. General Pershing expressed some doubts as to the advisability of offering the Germans terms of armistice and said he would prefer a demand for the surrender of the German armies, but if it was decided to propose terms of armistice he agreed with those of Foch and Pétain, with one addition, namely, the surrender of all U-boats and U-boat bases to the control of a neutral power. On this Haig remarked that this was not a matter for the generals. Pershing replied that the American Army was 3,000 miles from home, and that the German submarines constituted a formidable menace to his communications and were a matter of vital importance to the United States. It was agreed to include Pershing's proposal in the armistice terms.

At the conclusion of the Conference Foch sent the following note to Clemenceau:

After consulting the Commanders-in-chief of the American, British and French armies, I have the honour to inform you of the military conditions on which may be concluded an Armistice, capable of protecting completely the interests of the peoples concerned and of assuring to the Associated Governments absolute powers to impose and safeguard such terms of peace as the German Government may have accepted:—

1. Immediate evacuation of territory invaded unjustly: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg.

Immediate repatriation of their inhabitants. Surrender of a part of the enemy's war material in the regions to be evacuated. This evacuation should be made so rapidly as to prevent the enemy from taking away a great part of the war material and equipment of all kinds now in the occupied territories; that is to say, in the following manner:—

¹ Pershing: *My Experiences in the World War*, p. 669.

At the end of four days the Germans must have withdrawn behind the line marked 1 on the attached map; at the end of four more days behind line 2; at the end of six more days behind line 3;

In this way Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine will be liberated in fourteen days. These days will be reckoned from the day of the signing of the Armistice.

In any event the total material to be abandoned by the enemy should amount to:—

5,000 guns, half heavy, half field.¹
30,000 machine guns.²
3,000 trench mortars.

To be handed over where they are under conditions to be fixed.

The Allied troops will follow the enemy as he withdraws in accordance with instructions which will be issued later.

2. Evacuation of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine by the enemy's army.

The territory on the left bank of the Rhine will be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied troops in occupation.

The Allied troops will occupy this territory with garrisons, holding the chief points of passage over the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, with bridgeheads at these points with a radius of thirty kilometres on the right bank, and with garrisons holding the strategic points of the region.

A neutral zone will be established on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to it from the Swiss frontier to the Dutch frontier.

The evacuation of the Rhine district by the enemy will be carried out at the following intervals:—

Up to the Rhine: eight days after the period indicated above (twenty-two days in all from the signing of the Armistice).

To the boundary of the neutral zone: three days more (twenty-five days in all from the signing of the Armistice).

3. No destruction of any kind to be perpetrated in the territories to be evacuated nor must any damage or prejudice be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

4. The enemy must hand over under conditions to be fixed: 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 railway carriages in good condition.³

5. The German Command should be required to give information as to all mines or explosives with delayed-action fuses planted in the

¹ About one-third of the enemy's artillery material.

² About half the number of German machine guns.

³ 2,500 locomotives and 135,000 carriages had been taken by the Germans from the French and Belgian railways. The balance was required for the railways of the Rhine district.

territory to be evacuated and to help in their discovery and destruction under penalty of reprisals.

6. The carrying out of these conditions by the enemy will take fifteen days. In order to guarantee their execution the blockade will be maintained strictly during this period. Only after this period and when the conditions have been fulfilled should the supply of foodstuffs to the enemy be authorized, in accordance with special agreements to be drawn up.

7. Prisoners of war will be the subject of further agreements, aiming at their return at the earliest date possible in view of transport conditions.

As to the naval conditions the following appear to be necessary and sufficient:—

The enemy will hand over 150 submarines, under conditions to be determined; that is approximately the number at present able to put to sea.

All the German surface fleet will be withdrawn to the ports of the Baltic; the port of Cuxhaven and the island of Heligoland to be occupied by the Allied fleets.

The enemy will give information as to the position of all minefields and other obstacles, with the exception of those in territorial waters. The Allies to have the right to carry out mine sweeping whenever they judge this to be necessary.¹

F. FOCH.

It will be observed that there is no mention of Air Forces in these proposals.

As soon as the conference of the Commanders-in-chief ended General Pershing cabled a report of it and his own proposal for an armistice to Washington. To this he received an answer that the President was not in favour of the occupation of German territory during the Armistice. In general the President felt that the terms of the Armistice should be rigid enough to provide against renewal of hostilities by Germany but not humiliating beyond that necessity, as such terms would throw the advantage to the military party in Germany. On getting this answer Pershing cabled back that he was in favour of unconditional surrender, and he then sent the following note to the Supreme War Council:—

GENTLEMEN:

In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view:

1. Judging by their excellent conduct during the past three months, the British, French, Belgian and American armies appear capable of

¹ Foch : *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 86.

continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.

2. The American army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its growth both in personnel and matériel, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian Army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied armies.

3. German man-power is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over one-third of their artillery during the past three months in their effort to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.

4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the Western Front, not counting Italy, and of Germany, in rifles is:

Allies	1,563,000
Germany	1,134,000

An advantage in favour of the Allies of 37 per cent.

In guns:

Allies	22,413
Germany	16,495

An advantage of 35 per cent in favour of the Allies.

If Italy's forces should be added to the Western Front we should have a still greater advantage.

5. Germany's morale is undoubtedly low, her Allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.

6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German Army and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.

7. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.

8. On the other hand, the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.

9. A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present

strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her.

10. An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we sought for.

11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favourable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.

12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy's strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.

13. Finally, I believe the complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany, but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice, the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.

Respectfully submitted :

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Commander-in-Chief A.E.F.¹

Meanwhile the British War Cabinet had been in consultation with the First Sea Lord as to the naval terms of armistice. The Admiralty had information of mutinies in parts of the German fleet and had no doubt that a fleet action would result in its destruction with some British loss. It was agreed that the naval terms of armistice should aim at reducing the German Navy to approximately the size which could be permitted by the treaty of peace. On this the Admirals drew up the following terms:—

1. The immediate surrender of the German submarines complete with arms and equipment.
2. The surrender of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 8 light cruisers, and 50 of the most modern destroyers.
3. The paying off of all other German warships and auxiliaries.
4. The immobilization of all German aircraft.
5. The restoration of all Allied ships in German hands.
6. The blockade to be maintained.²

¹ Pershing: *My Experiences in the World War*, pp. 673 et seq.

² *Official History of the War*, Naval Operations, vol. v, p. 371.

These were much more severe than the naval terms which Foch proposed. He regarded the occupation of the Rhine as being of supreme importance, and was fearful that the British naval terms would cause the Germans to reject the Armistice, while if these terms were made easier there would be a greater chance of acceptance of the occupation of the Rhine. The Allied Naval Council learned that Foch had drawn up naval terms of armistice and proposed to lay them before the Supreme War Council. To this the Naval Council objected strongly, and the French Minister of Marine, who was its Chairman, protested to Clemenceau that Foch had no authority in naval matters and insisted that the only naval terms to be submitted to the Supreme War Council should be those approved of by the Allied Naval Council. This was agreed in principle and the Allied Naval Council met on 28 October, when the British representatives presented their proposed terms. The French delegates objected that these were too severe, and proposed that surrender of the German surface ships designated should not be demanded but that, instead, they should be interned, during the period of the Armistice, in ports to be designated by the Allies and that their ultimate disposal should be determined by the treaty of peace. This was a modification of Foch's proposal. After considerable dissension the Allied Council agreed to send forward the British proposals, with some minor modifications, to the Supreme War Council, accompanied by a note to the effect that the terms had been drafted on the assumption that the Germans had been defeated completely. If this proved not to be the case the Allied Naval Council would be prepared to redraft the terms.

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council had also been considering terms of armistice. General Bliss, in agreement with General Pershing, asked for total surrender and proposed:—

1. That the Associated Powers demand the complete disarmament and demobilization of the enemy's naval and military forces, leaving to him only such force as may be judged necessary for the maintenance of internal order. This implies the evacuation of all occupied territory and its evacuation not by men who are armed or are partially armed but by disarmed men. The army thus deprived of its weapons cannot fight, and being demobilized cannot be reassembled for the purposes of this war.

2. That the Associated Powers inform the enemy that there will be no modification of these war aims, which will be the subject of full and reasonable discussion between the Associated Powers, and that thereafter the enemy will be heard in certain of these matters: the enemy must submit to the final decisions of the Associated Powers, as being designed to assure the present and future peace of the world.

The French and Italian representatives agreed with Foch's terms, and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the British

Military Representative at Versailles proposed that only five per cent of the German Army should be allowed to keep its arms and on other matters were prepared to agree with Foch.

While matters were thus being prepared for the final decision of the Supreme War Council another problem which required immediate settlement arose. On 24 October Italian and British troops attacked the Austrian positions on the Piave. The Austrians gave way, and the defeat became a rout.

On 7 October the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent a note to President Wilson offering to conclude an armistice on every front and to enter immediately on negotiations for a peace on the basis of the President's statements to Congress on War Aims.

To this note the President replied on 18 October that events had modified his statement of the Fourteen Points of 8 January and that in any peace settlement the aspirations of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and of the Yugo-Slavs must be met to their satisfaction. To this the Austro-Hungarian Government replied on 27 October, accepting this condition and stating that it was prepared to enter at once into *pourparlers*, without awaiting the result of other negotiations. This was a clear indication that Austria was in dire straits, and on 30 October plenipotentiaries to conclude an armistice appeared on the Italian front.

The naval and military terms of armistice had been thoroughly surveyed, but there still remained the question how far the Allies, in agreeing to an armistice, were committed to President Wilson's Fourteen Points. This matter was discussed at a meeting of the Allied Premiers with Colonel House, as President Wilson's representative, in Paris on 29 October. The discussion was prolonged and at times somewhat acrimonious.¹ All the Allies had reservations to make with regard to the Fourteen Points. Finally it was agreed to send the following note to President Wilson with the request that it should be transmitted to the Germans:—

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enumerated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the Freedom of the Seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

¹ See David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, pp. 75 et seq.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the *aggression of Germany* by land, by sea, and from the air.¹

The way was now clear for the meeting of the Supreme War Council, which assembled at Versailles on 31 October. The first business was to settle the terms of armistice with Austria-Hungary. As it was known that the Austrian Empire was incapable of further resistance, there was no hesitation in imposing severe terms, and this was agreed quickly. The main conditions imposed were: immediate demobilization of the army and its reduction to twenty divisions at peace strength, surrender of half the artillery equipment, evacuation of all occupied territory, occupation by the Allies of such strategic points as they deemed necessary, right of free movement by the Allies over roads, railways, and waterways. The naval terms required the surrender of the fifteen newest submarines and all German submarines in Austrian waters, all other submarines to be paid off; the surrender of three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats, free navigation of territorial waters and inland waterways. The blockade was to be continued.² The Armistice with Austria was signed on 3 November.

The defeat of the Austrian Army in the battle of Vittorio Veneto was followed by a revolution in the Empire. The representatives of other nationalities than Austria seceded from the Reichsrat in Vienna, and Hungary declared her independence. This made a separate Armistice with Hungary necessary and this was signed on 13 November at Belgrade, the conditions being on the same general terms as those imposed on Austria;³ but they were drafted in a hurry and did not envisage the situation on the frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia and of Roumania, which led to subsequent complications.

When it came to the consideration of the armistice terms to be imposed on Germany there were many different proposals to be considered. President Wilson's proposals were contradictory, for, while he insisted that the terms should make any renewal of the war by Germany impossible, he was opposed to any occupation of German territory, and desired that the terms should not be humiliating. The military terms put forward varied between Haig's, which

¹ See David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, p. 84.

² For the complete terms, see Appendix III.

³ For the complete terms, see Appendix IV.

required nothing more than the evacuation of occupied territory and of Alsace-Lorraine, and those of Generals Pershing and Bliss, which required total surrender. Finally there was Foch's opposition, supported by the French representatives, to the British naval terms as approved by the Allied Naval Council. The discussion was therefore prolonged and agreement was not reached until 4 November. When the discussion began, Colonel House, informed of the views of Generals Pershing and Bliss and of General Pershing's correspondence with Washington, raised the question whether it was, in fact, desirable to agree to the German request for an armistice:—

COLONEL HOUSE. Would Marshal Foch prefer an armistice on the conditions proposed to continuing to fight?

MARSHAL FOCH. If our conditions are accepted we could wish for nothing better. We are only fighting to obtain these results and we do not wish to prolong the struggle uselessly.

COLONEL HOUSE. How long do you think that the enemy could hold out on the line of the Meuse or on that of the Rhine?

MARSHAL FOCH. One, two, three, four months; I cannot say. The Government of the United States, whose army is steadily increasing and therefore called to play a more and more important part in the war, and in its consequences, may well regard a refusal of the armistice with satisfaction.

In the eyes of the British Government, whom the armistice will make master of the German fleet, such a prospect seems less advantageous.

As far as we are concerned, such a refusal would postpone without gain the immense advantages which we would be able either to acquire immediately or be certain of obtaining eventually by the terms of armistice, and would keep us in a state of uncertainty.¹

Foch then proposed the following additions to the military terms which he had already submitted:—

Surrender of 2,000 aircraft, beginning with all D7s and all night bombers. Military establishments of all kinds in all territory evacuated by the enemy to be handed over intact. No damage to be done to permanent ways, navigable waterways, roads, bridges, telegraph or telephone lines. All military and civil employees of these to be maintained. The Armies of the Allies and of the United States to have rights of requisition in all occupied territory. The cost of maintaining the troops in occupation of the Rhineland (Alsace-Lorraine included) to be a charge on the German Government.

Enemy prisoners of war will only be released after the treaty of peace has been signed.

10,000 motor cars will be handed over to the Allies. The railways of

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 114.

Alsace-Lorraine will be handed over with all pre-war personnel and material.

In reply to the American proposal for complete disarmament and to the British proposal that only one-fifth of the German Army should be allowed to keep its arms, Foch replied that it was better to fix the number of arms to be handed over. The enemy should be required to leave these in the territory to be occupied, and this would deprive him almost immediately of his power to fight. There is not much doubt that Foch in making this stipulation wished to avoid anything which would rouse the military pride of the German Army, for fear that this would imperil the occupation of the Rhine, on which his heart was set.

In view of Foch's objections to the British naval terms, made on the same grounds, these were referred back to the Allied Naval Council with the request that internment of the German surface ships should be substituted for surrender. To this the Allied Naval Council agreed, and the relative clause was altered to read that the number of German warships specified should be forthwith disarmed and interned in neutral ports, or, failing these, Allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. In the event, it was found that there were no neutral or Allied ports conveniently placed and of sufficient size to take the ships to be handed over except Scapa Flow, and the Germans were ordered to bring the ships there. The Germans scuttled their ships when the terms of the peace treaty were known, and the question of their ultimate disposal did not arise.

On 4 November Foch's military terms and naval terms as revised were approved and sent to President Wilson, with the request that he would notify the German Government that Marshal Foch would receive accredited representatives of the German Government and would communicate to them the terms of an armistice. This the President did on 5 November, informing them at the same time of the reservations made by the Allied Governments in regard to the application of the Fourteen Points in a treaty of peace. On 5 November General Grönet, who had succeeded Ludendorff, attended a cabinet meeting in Berlin at which he stated that the resistance of the German Army to the attacks of the Allies could only be of short duration, and Prince Max of Baden then appointed a commission to negotiate an armistice. On 28 October the fleet in Kiel mutinied, the news of this reaching Paris on 3 November; this was the beginning of the revolution, which spread rapidly. In the early hours of 7 November the following telegram was received by Marshal Foch at his headquarters at Senlis:

The German High Command by order of the German Government to Marshal Foch.

The German Government having been informed by the President of the United States that Marshal Foch has been authorized to receive the accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the conditions of the Armistice has nominated the following representatives: General of Infantry von Gundel, Secretary of State Erzberger, Ambassador Count Oberndorff, General von Winterfeldt, Captain Vanselow of the Imperial Navy. They ask to be informed by wireless of the place where they can meet Marshal Foch. The German Government would be glad if, in the interest of humanity, the arrival of the German delegation on the Allied front should be the occasion for a provisional suspension of hostilities.¹

Marshal Foch replied giving the necessary directions to the German delegation, which arrived at Rethondes at 7 a.m. on the 8th. The Armistice was signed at 5.10 a.m. on 11 November,² and orders were issued for hostilities to cease at 11 a.m. on that day. There were doubts up to the last moment on the side of the Allies as to whether the Germans would accept the Armistice.

Events have shown that there were certain defects in the terms of armistice which had serious political consequences. The Allies had no information as to the intrigues of the German High Command, designed to shift the responsibility for the demand for an armistice and for its terms on to the German Government, nor did it know of Hindenburg's general order to his armies. Mr. Lloyd George had stated that it was necessary to bring home to the German people the extent of their defeat, but the importance of this was not sufficiently considered during the discussions on the terms of armistice. The position of the German Army in the life of the German people was well known, and the fact that the army had been defeated decisively should have been made clear. An armistice is a military measure, and the practice is for negotiations for an armistice to be conducted between the representatives of the respective High Commands. The Allies therefore appointed Marshal Foch as the representative of the Allied Armies and Admiral Wemyss as the representative of the Allied Navies, and they should not have been authorized to negotiate with anyone except the representatives of the German High Command. The communication to Marshal Foch announcing the appointment of the accredited German representatives was fraudulent. It was headed as coming from the German High Command, but it was in fact drafted in the German Foreign Office. Prince Max of Baden had appointed General von Gundel as head of the delegation, but the Foreign Office struck his name out and the head of the delegation which appeared at Rethondes was Erzberger, who had been a leader of the movement to obtain political control of the

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, p. 84.

² For the terms of Armistice, see Appendix IV.

army. We, therefore, from lack of circumspection, unwittingly played into the hands of those who were later to assert that the collapse of Germany was due not to the defeat of her armies but to the breakdown of the home front, to the 'stab in the back'. Foch also contributed to this. In his anxiety to do nothing which would imperil the acceptance of his demand for the occupation of the Rhine, he refused to agree to the proposal that only so much of the German Army as was needed to secure internal order should be allowed to retain its arms. The result of this was that the German troops marched home in good order, with their arms, with bands playing, and with colours flying, having been told by their leaders that they had not been defeated, but that peace was required by the home front. That created an impression of which the fullest political use was made, and was a substantial element in the military revival of Germany.

A further mistake of the same kind was made when, as is the usual practice, a commission was appointed by the Allies and by the Germans to supervise the execution of the Armistice. This commission was set up at Spa; it should have had its seat in Berlin and have been accompanied by an adequate Allied escort maintained at German expense. The last point in the terms of armistice which is open to criticism was the decision to maintain the blockade. It was quite reasonable to do as Foch suggested, to maintain the blockade until the terms of armistice had been fulfilled; but, once the war material demanded had been surrendered and the Allied forces were established on the Rhine, it became obvious that Germany was militarily helpless, a helplessness which was increased by internal disorders. It was neither necessary nor wise to maintain the blockade beyond this period, and the fact that we did so became a political weapon against us.

The prime causes of these mistakes were that the end came unexpectedly, that the extent of the defeat of the German armies was not realized, and that the discussions on the terms of armistice had to be conducted in haste and in complicated conditions. While the matters described in this chapter were under debate, a great battle was raging on the Western Front, and important developments in the military situation were taking place almost daily. There were at the same time the protracted dispute between the governments of Great Britain and France over Turkey, described in the previous chapter, and an awkward triangular correspondence between the United States, Germany and the Allies. The obvious lesson is, *Be prepared.*

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE ARMISTICES AND THE PEACE TREATIES

THE signing of the Armistice with Germany was the occasion of a universal outburst of joy and relief. Fighting was over, and that meant to the public at large that peace had come and that the immediate task was to get back as quickly as possible to business as usual. No attempt was made by the Government to explain that an armistice was nothing more than a suspension of hostilities, as a preliminary to negotiations for peace, and that if the fruits of victory were to be secured it was essential that the victors should be strong enough to impose on the vanquished such conditions of peace as they held to be desirable, and should be in a position to insist on their fulfilment. In fact such political action as was taken confirmed the general impression that peace had come, for the Labour party denounced the political truce and went into opposition, while the Government decided to advise the King to dissolve Parliament and to have an immediate general election. This decision had serious consequences, for the election absorbed the attention and energies of Ministers, and the consideration of grave questions which required immediate attention had to be postponed. Further, as is usual in general elections, hopes were held out and promises made which could not be realized. The problem of how to reconstitute a Parliament which has outlived its term is difficult during a war, but the experience of the last war shows that the period immediately following an armistice is a highly inconvenient one in which to hold a general election, and that the party truce should be continued at least until the treaties of peace have been ratified.

When people have been living under great strain for a number of years the reaction when the strain is relaxed is apt to be severe. The first bodies to be affected by this reaction after 11 November 1918 were the Services. Hopes of early demobilization had been held out during the general election, and various influential bodies were given a voice in planning this, with the result that the execution of arrangements carefully drawn up suffered from interference and delay. There was a very natural demand from industry for the speediest possible return to the normal; this meant the speediest possible release of men from the Services and particularly of key men. There were consequently many claims for special consideration and political influence was used to further these claims.

The result of this was that the men in the Services became suspicious; they suspected that those who had influence were being

demobilized out of turn and that men serving at home had better opportunities than those serving abroad. This led to widespread discontent, which on occasions verged on mutiny. Early in January a large number of men who were due to return from leave to France refused at Folkestone to embark. Shortly afterwards a demonstration of soldiers demanding demobilization took place in Downing Street, and a little later a large body of soldiers threatened to march on London, and Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson had to tell the Prime Minister that he could not rely on the troops at home (he was Commander-in-chief of the Home Forces) to coerce their comrades. Later still, angry demonstrations occurred at the base depots in France, and the military authorities became fearful that the discipline of the Army would break down. Mr. Winston Churchill, who on the reconstruction of the Government after the general election became Secretary of State for War and Air, tackled the difficulty with his usual energy, and after considerable discussion with his Cabinet colleagues induced them to agree to a modified form of conscription for the post-Armistice period. On 30 January he issued to the Services an order for which he was responsible, which began:

Unless we are to be defrauded of the fruits of victory and, without considering our Allies, to throw away all that we have won with so much cost and trouble, we must provide for a good many months to come armies of occupation for the enemy's territory. These armies must be strong enough to exact from the Germans, Turks and others the just terms which the Allies demand, and we must take our share with France, America and Italy in providing them.¹

The order went on to say that 900,000 men would be retained in the Army for one year, chosen from those who had enlisted after 1 January 1916, and from those not over thirty-seven years of age. To this force would belong sixty-nine battalions of young soldiers eighteen years old, who would be used only in the Home Army and the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. A similar order provided for the retention of 75,000 men in the Royal Air Force, and substantial bonuses for all ranks of both Services were provided at a cost of £36,500,000. Similar bonuses were also announced for those continuing to serve in the Royal Navy.

This arrangement served for a time and stopped the rot which had threatened to set in. It was announced that no men on leave would be demobilized, the system and method of demobilization were explained, and this met the chief grievances of the serving men. But the force thus provided proved to be inadequate, for the end of hostilities left Great Britain with many and with special military commitments. Foch had fixed the size of the army required for the

¹ *The Times*, 3 January 1919.

occupation of the Rhineland and the size of the contingents which the Associated Powers were to provide for that army. He wanted from us ten divisions and two cavalry divisions. In addition we had to provide our share of the army of occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, we had detachments in Transcaucasia and in Armenia, we had to keep 100,000 men in Mesopotamia to make it secure during its period of transition into an independent State, and to garrison Palestine. These were all new commitments, in addition to our normal garrisons in India and the colonies, which made it necessary for us to have in peacetime a regular army of 220,000 men.

We were not alone in thinking that the signing of the Armistice meant a speedy reversion to peace conditions. The Belgian Army was demobilized on return home, and there was an insistent demand in France for the release of men in the Services, which in some parts of the country produced serious disturbances. The traditions of France made it easier to meet this demand than it was for us, for France was accustomed to compulsory service in peacetime and there was no difficulty in arranging for a systematic release of the older classes. She had fewer overseas commitments than we had, and with the application of compulsory service to her colonies she was able to fill the gaps in her metropolitan army with colonial troops; but, in spite of this, there was before long a noticeable diminution in France's military strength. As to the United States, the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, from President Wilson downwards, was disposed to regard the settlement of post-Armistice problems as matters for the statesmen to handle, and they resisted what they regarded as interference by the generals. In fact no one had envisaged what the state of the world would be when hostilities ceased. There were no precedents for the situation left by a struggle in which more than 50,000,000 men had been in arms, in which colossal casualties had been suffered, in which the normal means of transit and communications had been interrupted, in which whole peoples had been reduced to the verge of starvation, and in which old-established Governments were tumbling down and new States being set up.

Mr. Lloyd George has given us a picture of the state of the world during the Peace Conference:—

Whilst the delegates of the Great Powers were occupied with deciding the outlines of the Peace Treaty with Germany, their deliberations were constantly interrupted by reports of armed conflicts in every corner of the vast battle area of the War, from the Pacific shores to the Black Sea and the Baltic, and from the frozen rivers of Siberia to the sunny shores of the Adriatic. There were scores of little wars going on—some conducted with a savagery which looked as if man had reverted to the type of

barbarian he was in the ferocious days of Tamerlane and Attila. What happened in the ruthless struggle between Red and White in Siberia, in Southern Russia and in the Ukraine, is too ghastly to perpetuate in the memory of man. It is an agony to dwell upon the details of horror enacted in these orgies of hate. Hell was let loose and made the most of its time.

But these little wars came nearer to us than Russia. The emancipated races of Southern Europe were at each other's throats in their avidity to secure choice bits of the carcasses of dead Empires. Pole and Czech were fighting over Teschen. The Poles and the Ukrainians had both pounced on Galicia, whilst Roumanians and Serbs were tearing up Hungary and Austria. Poles and Lithuanians had their fangs on the same cities and forests. Where races were mixed near frontiers, the snarling and clawing were deafening. The Congress could not get on with its work for the uproar. These areas were the mangrove swamps where the racial roots were so tangled and intermingled that no peacemakers could move inside them without stumbling. The resurrected nations rose from their graves hungry and ravening from their long fast in the vaults of oppression.¹

Add to this gloomy review of the state of the world the story of our more private problems—troubles in India resulting in a war with Afghanistan, troubles in Egypt, troubles in Ireland culminating in civil war, demands for more troops for each of these scenes of disturbance, and grave labour troubles and strikes at home which made it necessary to reinforce the garrisons of Great Britain in order to preserve internal order—and it will be seen that Ministers had much on their hands besides the making of treaties of peace. It had not been foreseen, except by the Inter-Allied Transport Council, the recommendations of which were overruled, that two separate organizations would be required to cope with two distinct problems, one to deal with the restoration of normal life and order, the other to prepare the peace treaties. Nor had it been foreseen that the task of settling a disrupted world would be so formidable as it proved to be. The general impression in December 1918 was that the main lines of a peace treaty with Germany could be drawn up and agreed upon in a few weeks. Actually it was seven and a half months before this treaty was signed and more than a year before it was ratified, while it was more than five years before the ratifications of the last of the treaties of peace were obtained. While a great deal of research had been done and a vast amount of material had been collected by the Government departments of the principal Associated Powers, there had been little opportunity for bringing the views of the several departments together and none for co-ordinating the views of the several governments, while almost all of their investigations had been concerned with the problems of the treaties of peace and very little

¹ David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. i, p. 306.

consideration had been given to the questions which might arise during the post-Armistice period.

The opportunity of a visit of Clemenceau and Foch to London was taken to consider the preliminaries of the Peace Conference at a meeting of Allied Ministers on 2 and 3 December. It had been agreed that the first armistice with Germany should be for a limited period, in order that its conditions might be reviewed if she should show reluctance to fulfil its terms, and accordingly the Armistice of 11 November was given a duration of thirty-six days, subject to renewal. At the meeting of 2 December Foch was authorized to renew the Armistice for one month and this was done at Trèves on 13 December, the new agreement stipulating that it would be renewed monthly, subject to the approval of the Allied Governments, Foch at the same time reserving the right to occupy the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine at six days' notice to the Germans. It was also decided at the meeting on 3 December to refer the question of victualling and supplying enemy, Allied and neutral countries in all its aspects, including the use of enemy merchant vessels, to an International Committee for investigation and report.

This was a problem the urgency of which might well have been foreseen. Before the Armistice with Germany was signed the question of feeding the peoples in the occupied territories from which the enemy had been driven had become urgent and had been taken in hand. The continuance of the blockade had been the one item in the Armistice conditions which had aroused a protest from the German Government, that instructed its plenipotentiaries at Rethondes to make the following declaration on signing the Armistice:

The German Government will undertake to carry out all the conditions laid down. At the same time the undersigned feel obliged to point out that the fulfilment of some points of these conditions will drive into a famine the population of those parts of Germany which will not be occupied. By leaving all provisions which were intended for the troops in the areas to be evacuated, by restricting the means of communication and at the same time keeping up the blockade (which is equivalent to the withholding of food) any effort at dealing with the food question and organizing the same is made impossible. The undersigned therefore request that negotiations will be allowed on these points and that they will be so altered that proper nourishment will be assured.¹

As far back as 8 November Colonel House had cabled from Paris to President Wilson:—

Probably the greatest problem which will be presented to us upon the cessation of hostilities is the furnishing of food and other essential supplies

¹ *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, vol. vi, p. 3326.

to the civilian population of Serbia, Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Belgium, and Northern France. This relief work, together with the reconstruction of devastated regions, will have to be done almost entirely through American effort, and with the use of American food, raw materials, and finished products. Difficult questions of priority and the allocation of tonnage will be presented. At one of the meetings of the Supreme War Council, Mr. Balfour proposed that as a condition of the Armistice to be offered to Germany the large amount of German tonnage now in German and neutral ports be handed over during the Armistice for operation by the Allies and the United States under the general supervision and control of the Allied Maritime Transport Council now sitting in London. I advised that this be not made a condition of the Armistice, but be taken up as soon as the Armistice was signed, and Mr. Balfour acquiesced in this suggestion. I now advise that instead of adopting Mr. Balfour's suggestion which presents obvious objections, you, as soon as the Armistice with Germany is signed, propose to the Allies and Germany the immediate formation of the 'International Relief Organization'. I suggest that Hoover be placed at the head of this organization and two representatives each be named by England, France, Italy, and Germany. Germany should at once be asked to place at the disposal of this organization until the final Peace Treaty is signed the entire German Mercantile Marine now in German or neutral ports. The organization should then be charged with securing food and other supplies immediately required for the civilian populations of the countries set forth and in determining the priority of the needs presented. These supplies would necessarily have to be furnished by the United States and the Allies. It should be pointed out to Germany that only in this way will it be possible for her merchant marine to be placed in service from the inception of the Armistice until the final Peace Treaty is signed, and that her willingness to enter wholeheartedly into such a scheme of relief, which would include her own civilian population, would be the best possible evidence of her desire to alleviate the suffering caused the civilian population of all countries by the exigencies of the war. In this way also the whole question of relief, pending the signing of the final Treaty of Peace, can be kept separate from the very keen struggle which will arise immediately following the signing of the Armistice between the various belligerent nations for selfish trade advantage. It is true that the terms of the Armistices provide that the blockade should be continued. The impracticability of this, so far as food and other essential supplies are concerned, has already become apparent. Conditions in Austria and in Bohemia are of such a character as to make relief on a large scale imperative if serious disturbances are to be averted. I should appreciate very much an expression of your views on this most urgent matter.¹

The President replied expressing complete agreement and saying

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 240.

that Hoover was coming over to discuss the matter and make proposals. Now there was a very strong case for American direction of relief, and, in particular, for putting Mr. Hoover in charge. As Director of the Belgian Relief Commission he had done admirable work, and the prestige and experience which that work gave him singled him out. Further, about eighty per cent of the expenditure on relief had been provided by the United States, and, as Colonel House had pointed out, the bulk of the foodstuffs needed must come from the American continent. But this proposal, like so many others made at this period, was made by the representatives of one country without investigation of what was already being done or of what machinery was already in existence. The provision of foodstuffs was only one part of the problem; effective distribution was at least of equal importance. This meant the provision of shipping, and it was a hasty assumption that this could be met by commandeering the German Mercantile Marine. Nor did the matter end with the provision of shipping and foodstuffs; effective distribution required the use of adequate ports and, before many of these could be used, much mine-sweeping had to be done, while railway and inland water communication had to be restored. The whole business of the supply and distribution of foodstuffs was therefore very complicated, and it happened that there was in existence an efficient and experienced Allied committee which had perfected its organization and machinery by a process of trial and error. This body was the Allied Maritime Transport Council, composed of two Ministers, nominated by France, by Italy, and by Great Britain, and of two representatives of the United States. It was provided with an adequate permanent staff, which by the time of the Armistice with Germany had learned its job. The Council had been established early in 1918 for the purpose of supervising the general conduct of Allied transport in order to obtain the most effective use of tonnage for the prosecution of the war, while leaving each nation responsible for the management of the tonnage under its control. If America was the largest potential provider of foodstuffs, Great Britain was the main source of tonnage and, besides providing ships flying the Red Ensign, had been the chief agent in securing neutral tonnage. Agreements were completed with Norway, Sweden, Denmark for the use of all surplus tonnage in return for food supplies and coal, while, as Holland was unable to enter into an agreement, surplus Dutch shipping was requisitioned. France had the equivalent of over one million tons gross of British shipping in her service, and we had obtained for her over 400,000 tons of neutral shipping. Italy had three-quarters of a million tons of British shipping, and nearly 300,000 tons gross of neutral shipping; while the United States had half a million tons of British shipping and nearly one million tons of neutral shipping in use, and we

had transported the bulk of the American Army to France.¹

Great Britain could, then, fairly say that she was in a position to make a contribution equal to that of the United States to the feeding of Europe, but apart from this it was only common sense to use an existing organization which had proved its efficiency, rather than set up a new one. The Allied Maritime Council was in direct touch with the Food Council, which co-ordinated Committees on wheat, meat and fats, oil, seeds, and sugar. It had taken in hand the supply of foodstuffs to both France and Italy and, as has been mentioned, the feeding of the peoples in the occupied districts reconquered from the enemy. The one gap in the organization as it stood at the time of the Armistice with Germany was that the Council had no authority or power to finance the feeding of Europe.

On 18 October 1918, the Allied Maritime Council and the Food Council passed a joint resolution to the effect that the supplies required for Europe after the Armistice should be arranged through the existing Allied organization, that the Merchant Marine of the enemy powers should be placed under the direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council for this purpose, and that this Council should be enlarged and converted, without breach of continuity, into a General Economic Council. This recommendation was approved by the British War Cabinet on 13 November, and the proposal was transmitted to the Associated Powers. It met with a very cold reception from Mr. Hoover, who wrote to the President expressing the strongest objection to the distribution of supplies and credits coming from the United States by a body mainly composed of foreigners. Hoover sailed for Europe and arrived in Paris on 26 November. The next day Colonel House cabled to President Wilson:

Hoover arrived in Paris on Tuesday morning. I am fully advised of and in agreement with his plans. They are in general in accordance with my telegram, which you approved in principle, such alterations having been incorporated therein to meet the Allied desire for co-ordination of action and our policy of maintaining independence of American action. The chief problem presented is the difficulty of devising a plan which will not antagonize the Allies and particularly Great Britain and at the same time permit single American leadership in relief to the civilian populations of Europe. I am sure you will agree that American leadership is essential, taking into account the fact that we are the most disinterested nation and that the Allies are affected by local political interests. Further, the supplies to be utilized for this purpose must in the main be obtained in the United States and will dominate American markets.²

¹ The War Cabinet: *Report for the Year 1918*, Cmd. 325, pp. 22 *et seq.* and p. 176.

² *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 247.

The chief problem was not, as Colonel House said, that of reconciling divergent Allied interests, but that of getting food as quickly as possible to starving peoples. Unfortunately neither President Wilson, Colonel House nor Mr. Hoover had knowledge of the work being done by existing organizations, and their action resulted in the scrapping of machinery which was running well, and in setting up a new organization, which naturally needed time, experience and authority to become effective.

The first result of Mr. Hoover's objection to the British proposal was, as has been said, that the meeting of Allied Premiers in London on 3 December decided to appoint a new International Committee to examine and report on the whole problem. Mr. Hoover came to London in the second week of December and secured general agreement for the establishment of a Relief Organization under his direction. Then came the British general election and until the new British Government was in being no final decisions could be taken; so it was not until 11 January 1919, two months after the Armistice with Germany, that the Allied Supreme Council of Supply and Relief was set up with Mr. Hoover as Director-General of Relief. Of this body Sir Arthur Salter wrote that it had to operate 'without the assistance of a staff accustomed to work together and without either the uniting force of the war or the tradition of united action which that force had given to the war organizations'.¹ Nor had the new Council been given powers to provide the transport which was essential if its plans were to become operative. It is therefore not surprising that it did not work effectively, and in February it was replaced by the Supreme Economic Council, which was, in effect, a body almost exactly similar to that which the British Government had proposed to set up in the previous October.

On 16 January another meeting of the Armistice Plenipotentiaries took place at Trèves, at which the Armistice was prolonged until 17 February, and a number of modifications were made in the conditions of armistice. The Germans complained that it was impossible for them to hand over all the rolling stock demanded, and it was agreed to substitute for a part of this a quantity of agricultural machinery. In addition to the surrender of sea-going submarines, the destruction of all others and the cessation of submarine construction was demanded. As a further guarantee, power was taken to occupy at six days' notice a strip of territory on the right bank of the Rhine opposite to the fortress of Strasbourg. Finally, the demand for German shipping, which should have been included in the original terms of armistice, was made in the following terms:—

In order to secure the provisioning of Germany and of the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place

¹ J. A. Salter: *Allied Shipping Control*, p. 216.

the German fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.

This arrangement shall in nowise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews so replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.

Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the Allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.

All questions of details, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessels, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately.¹

An agreement such as this would almost certainly have been accepted by Germany if it had been included in the conditions of 11 November 1918. Now they were suspicious of its late appearance and, believing that they would not get the ships back again, they found numerous reasons for delaying the transfer, one of the most cogent of which was that most of Germany's chief ports were controlled by Communists, who had no respect for orders from Berlin. But this was not the only cause of obstruction. The French wished to reduce any concessions to Germany to a bare minimum, and Clemenceau stated that he believed the reports of starvation in Germany were exaggerated, that General Mangin had told him there was more food in Mayence than in Paris, that the Germans could not be hungry if they refused to hand over the ships to bring them food, and that in his opinion they were trying to blackmail the Allies. At a meeting in the second week of March Mr. Lloyd George brought matters to a head by reading the following telegram dated 8 March from General Plumer, who was in command at Cologne:—

Please inform the Prime Minister that, in my opinion, food must be sent into this area by the Allies without delay. Even now the present rations are insufficient to maintain life, and owing to the failure of supplies from Germany, they must very soon be still further reduced. The mortality amongst women, children, and sick is most grave, and sickness due to hunger is spreading. The attitude of the population is becoming one of despair, and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation. All this naturally results in great activity by subversive and disorderly elements. Apart from the imminence of danger from the situation, the continuance of these conditions is unjustifiable. I request therefore that a definite date be fixed for the arrival of the first supplies. This date should not be later than the 16th March, even if from that date regular supplies cannot be maintained.²

Mr. Lloyd George clinched the matter by declaring bluntly that

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. i, pp. 477 *et seq.*

² David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. i, p. 297.

the soldiers who had helped the Allies to conquer the Germans would refuse to continue to occupy a territory in order to maintain the populace in a state of starvation. As a result of this meeting a new agreement was made with Germany in the middle of March, under which the first German ships left German ports on 22 March and the first shipload of food reached Hamburg on 26 March. Shipping had, in fact, been the key to the problem of relief, and as the result of ravages of U-boats and German commerce-destroyers shipping was none too plentiful at the time of the Armistice. Both France and Italy had still to import foodstuffs and coal, troops from the armies overseas had to be brought home for demobilization, released prisoners of war to be repatriated, and clearly Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugo-Slavia had a just claim to precedence over Germany in the supply of food. There was therefore nothing unreasonable in making the feeding of Germany dependent on the supply of German ships, but with an earlier study by the Allied and Associated Governments of a problem which was foreseen by all of them much unnecessary suffering and loss of life would have been avoided and the enemy would not have been provided with material for propaganda.

As the period for the third renewal of the Armistice in mid-February approached, anxieties were expressed by some of the military advisers of the Supreme War Council. The continuous demand for demobilization was reducing materially the strength of the Allied armies, and though Germany had handed over the large quantity of weapons demanded in the Armistice of 11 November and had abandoned still more when she withdrew from the territories she had occupied, there were fears that there was still in Germany a great accumulation of arms and that more were being turned out from her factories. To meet this state of affairs and to show Germany that any attempt to rearm would be met by prompt action, the military representatives of Great Britain and Italy proposed that the position of the Allies on the Rhine should be strengthened by the occupation of more German territory. General Bliss, the American representative, protested and said 'that the Allies had every reason for supporting the then existing Government in Germany; that this Government was as nearly a democratic one as could be expected at that time and under the circumstances; that the continual pin-thrusts being made by the Allies were playing into the hands of the opponents in Germany of this Government; that, if another revolution came, this Government would probably be succeeded either by an imperialistic military one, or by a Bolshevik one; and that, finally, instead of these continual additions of new terms to the Armistice, there should be drawn up at once the final military peace terms which, being imposed upon Germany without further delay, would relieve the Allies of all further apprehension'.¹

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 335.

Foch expressed no opinion at this meeting, but afterwards he had a talk with General Bliss in which he said that he was in sympathy with the American position and that the proposals of the British and Italians might bring about a clash and then everything would flare up again. He was of opinion that an immediate peace should be made with Germany so that the wheels of industry should be started in motion throughout the world. The result of this was that a strong Commission composed of statesmen and soldiers, with Foch as chairman, was appointed to examine the question, and on 12 February it submitted the following report to the Supreme Council:—

The members of the Committee desire to express this their opinion:— to obtain as rapidly as possible a final result, and to put a stop to the difficulties which are constantly raised by the Germans, the members of the Committee are of the opinion that Naval and Military terms of peace should be drawn up immediately by a Commission appointed for the purpose, and shall be imposed on the enemy.¹

Clemenceau was at first disposed to object. President Wilson was returning to the United States for a short visit, and the French Premier said that he could not agree to a matter of this importance being decided in his absence. To this the President replied that he was quite willing to leave the matter to his military adviser, and the Supreme Council decided that:—

Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the preliminaries of peace shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments.²

The Armistice was accordingly renewed for the third time on 16 February without material change and for an indefinite period, the Allies reserving to themselves power to denounce it at three days' notice.

The Committee on the military terms got to work quickly and had little difficulty in reaching agreement. But it became apparent that in the opinion of the Committee there was a direct connexion between the question of frontiers and the question of the size of the forces which Germany was to be allowed to maintain. As far back as 10 January Foch had submitted a long memorandum on these questions. In this he reviewed the history of Germany from the

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 339.

time of Frederick the Great and maintained that her attitude had been consistently aggressive and militaristic, that this had become part of the nature of her people and would not be changed by labelling her government democratic. He pointed out that the population of Germany and of the German provinces of Austria amounted to 75,000,000 and that, even when the population of German Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine were deducted, it would amount to 64,000,000, against which France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine could oppose only 49,000,000. France could no longer count on Russia, and it was the part taken by Russia in the war which had gained the time for Great Britain to develop her military strength and the United States to bring her armies across the Atlantic. He therefore demanded as an indispensable condition of security for France that the Rhine should be the western frontier of Germany and proposed:—

1. That military access to and political propaganda with districts of the left bank of the Rhine should be forbidden to Germany and that these districts should be covered by a neutral zone on the right bank.

2. That the military occupation of the districts of the left bank should be maintained by the forces of the Allies.

3. That the districts of the left bank of the Rhine should be assured the conditions necessary for their economic life by linking them through a common tariff system with the western states. Under these conditions and in conformity with the accepted principles of the liberty of peoples, new autonomous states may be created on the left bank of the Rhine, which will be self governing, subject to the restrictions mentioned above, and with the aid of a strong natural frontier, the Rhine, will secure peace for Western Europe.¹

This proposal was supported by the French Government and some informal discussion of it had taken place, but it was not until it became known that Foch was insisting on the inclusion of the Rhine frontier in the military terms to be presented to Germany that this question was brought to an issue. Soon after his return from completing the third extension of the Armistice at Trèves Foch had a talk with General Sir Henry Wilson, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This talk General Wilson reported in a memorandum which was sent to Colonel House on 19 February:—

I had an interesting interview with Marshal Foch this morning in which he expressed the following views: As the result of his recent discussions with the German representatives at Trèves, he is of opinion that under existing conditions we can dictate terms of peace to Germany. The

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, pp. 127 *et seq.*

German Government will agree to whatever terms we exact. But, he says, there is no time to lose. At present Germany has only one thought, and that is peace, the reasons being that her Government is insecure and wants peace in order to consolidate its position, and the people fear above all things a renewal of hostilities. Further fighting would take place on German soil, and the Germans are afraid of the devastation of their territory. In the opinion of the Marshal, Germany has at present no military forces with which she could hope to dispute the advance of the Allied armies.

For these reasons Germany will agree to our terms if we are prompt, but no one can say how long the existing conditions will last. Delay is dangerous. The Marshal, therefore, strongly advocates the settling at once of the three principal conditions of the peace that the Allies intend to impose on Germany; namely:—

1. The strength of her armed forces.
2. Her frontiers.
3. The indemnity she is to pay.

He considers that if these matters could be settled by the Peace Conference during the next few days, and if he could be entrusted with the mission of proceeding again to Trèves with the Allied terms, say this day week, he would guarantee that the Germans would accept the terms on the following day. The world would then pass from a state of war to a state of peace for which it longs so ardently, and there would be universal rejoicing.

As regards the three points mentioned above, Marshal Foch anticipates no difficulty in coming to an agreement during the next forty-eight hours as to the strength of Germany's peace army and navy. He is strongly in favour of saying to the Germans in this preliminary peace treaty that, whatever may be the fate of the Rhenish provinces and whatever form of government for these provinces the Allies may decide in favour of, under no circumstances will the German Empire extend beyond the Rhine. That in his opinion is essential for the security of France, and makes the settlement of the Western frontier a simple matter. He also considers that there should be no insuperable difficulties in settling a provisional frontier between Germany and Poland, which would be capable of modification in detail later. The Marshal would settle on a lump sum for Germany to pay, and suggested 100 *milliards* of francs. It is, he says, not his business to consider the actual sum, but he pleads forcibly for the principle of including a lump sum by way of indemnity in the terms to be presented to Germany the next time he goes to Trèves. If the conditions of a preliminary peace treaty can thus be imposed on Germany, the Allies can then turn their attention to the Russian problem, which must take time to solve.¹

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 343.

Clemenceau was as insistent as Foch on the importance of a preliminary treaty at the earliest possible date. He too insisted on the Rhine frontier and proposed to set up a Rhenish Republic, but was averse from separating the military terms from the other chief demands to be made in Germany. Colonel House cabled Sir Henry Wilson's memorandum to the President, who replied at once:—

I have just read the memorandum given you by the Chief of the British and Imperial General Staff of an interview with Marshal Foch. It seems to me to be an attempt to use the good offices of the French to hurry us into an acquiescence in their plans with regard to the western bank of the Rhine. I know I can trust you and your colleagues to withstand such a programme immovably, except of course I am willing to have the strictly military and naval terms promptly decided and presented to the Germans. I am not willing to have anything beyond the military and naval terms settled and believe that the Conference of Ten would be going very much beyond its powers to attempt anything of the kind.¹

Here was an impasse. Clemenceau and Foch insisted that the military terms to which they would agree must depend on whether or no the Rhine frontier was secured, and that they must have the indemnity fixed and obtain an adequate guarantee for its payment. No definite decision could be reached in President Wilson's absence, but the question was discussed by the other Plenipotentiaries and on 12 March Mr. Lloyd George in a talk with Colonel House found the germ of a solution. He was positive that the British public would never agree to the creation of another Alsace-Lorraine on the Rhine or to maintaining a British Army of Occupation for an indefinite period. At the same time he was sympathetic to the French demand for security, and he said that in the event of an invasion of France Great Britain would undertake to come at once to the rescue. This proposal appealed to President Wilson, and he made a similar offer on behalf of the United States; after some discussion this offer was presented formally to the French Government on 28 March:—

In a separate treaty by the United States, a pledge by the United States, subject to the approval of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against her is made by Germany.²

This offer was made conditional upon France's abandoning her proposals to create independent states on the left bank of the Rhine and to occupy the line of the Rhine. Mr. Lloyd George associated Great Britain with this offer on the same conditions.

¹ *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. iv, p. 346.

² *Ibid.*, p. 410.

These conditions did not satisfy the French, who pointed out that experience showed that Great Britain required a long time to develop her military strength and that distance would cause the military help of the United States to be still slower in arriving. In the interval France would find herself alone. Nor did the League of Nations provide an adequate guarantee, for its machinery would work too slowly to prevent the invasion of territory at the beginning of a war. M. Clemenceau therefore proposed as a basis of agreement the following conditions:—

In the event of Germany violating the conditions of peace imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments and committing an act of aggression against France, Great Britain and the United States will support France with their armed forces.

Consequently

1. The date on which the bridge-heads on the right bank of the Rhine and the territories on the left bank are to be evacuated will be fixed in the treaty of peace (taking into account the guarantees necessary to secure the execution of the financial clauses).

2. Germany should be prohibited from maintaining armed forces or military establishments either on the left bank of the Rhine or in a zone fifty kilometres wide on the east of the river. The German army should not be permitted to carry out manœuvres in these areas. Recruiting even by a call for volunteers should be prohibited in them. All fortifications in them should be demolished and no new fortifications constructed. No material of war shall be manufactured in them. (Some of these clauses appear in the proposed terms for a preliminary peace, but on the present basis they should be strengthened.)

3. Great Britain, the United States and France should have the right to assure themselves, by means of a permanent commission of investigation in the zone in question, of the execution of the terms imposed on Germany (without this right Clause 2 would be valueless).

4. Great Britain, the United States and France are agreed to consider as an act of aggression any entry or attempt at entry by all or by a part of the German army of the zone defined in Clause 2.

5. In addition, Great Britain and the United States recognize the right of France to occupy the line of the Rhine with five bridge-heads of a radius of twenty kilometres, if Germany should be reported by the commission of inspection to have failed to observe the conditions of Clause 2, or any one of the military, naval and air clauses of the preliminary peace.

(In fact if France were to give up permanent occupation of the Rhine, it is, as a minimum, necessary that she should be able, in the event of a threat of war or of a breach by Germany of her engagements, to advance her troops to the only good defensive line, namely the Rhine.)

6. Great Britain and the United States recognize France's right to the frontier of 1914 and the right to occupy, without annexation and as an act of reparation, the mining district of the Saar, not included in this frontier.

PS.—It is unnecessary to say that the French Government by an act of aggression against France means also an act of aggression against Belgium.¹

The first five clauses of this memorandum showed that Clemenceau was prepared on conditions to give up France's claim to permanent occupation of the Rhine and to the separation of the left bank of the Rhine from the rest of Germany. This led to a compromise. It was agreed that the German provinces on the left bank and a zone of fifty kilometres on the right bank should be completely demilitarized, that the existing occupation of the Rhineland should be continued for fifteen years for the southern zone, for ten years for the central zone, and for five years for the northern zone, and that Great Britain and the United States should guarantee by treaty aid to France in the event of German aggression. This satisfied Clemenceau, but these negotiations took so long that the idea of having a preliminary military treaty was abandoned and this agreement was embodied in the main treaty. Foch continued to protest with all his energy that permanent occupation of the Rhine was the only real guarantee of security for France, but Clemenceau brushed his objections aside and refused to listen to him any more on this question. The Treaties between Great Britain, the United States and France guaranteeing aid to France in case of aggression were signed on 28 June,¹ but the Senate of the United States refused to ratify their treaty and that of Great Britain consequently lapsed. France's demand for some alternative guarantee of security was one of the prime causes of difficulty in the post-war years, and her unwillingness to reduce her armed forces, failing such a guarantee, was the main obstacle in the way of a general limitation of armaments.

Meanwhile the Commission charged with drawing up the military terms of preliminary treaty with Germany, over which Foch presided, presented its report on 3 March. Foch had no illusions as to the possibility of disarming Germany permanently against her will—indeed the history of attempts to impose limitations of armaments on a defeated foe in a treaty of peace shows that they are only successful for as long as there is power to enforce them; nor did he believe that power to exert such pressure upon 80,000,000 people would be available indefinitely. His object, therefore, was to make the restoration of the German Army to the standard of 1914 as

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, pp. 151 *et seq.*

² For the full text of these treaties, see *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. iii, pp. 337 *et seq.*

difficult as possible. For this purpose he proposed that in principle Germany should only be permitted to maintain the armed force necessary for the maintenance of internal order. This force should not exceed 200,000 men, exclusive of officers; the number of officers and officials of officers' rank should not exceed 9,000.

This force should be organized in fifteen divisions of infantry, five divisions of cavalry, with staffs for five army corps and one headquarters staff.

The officers and non-commissioned officers were to be recruited voluntarily and to be obliged to serve for twenty-five years in the case of officers and fifteen years in the case of non-commissioned officers. The private soldiers were to be drawn successively from each annual class in any way which Germany might choose, on the condition that their term of service was not to exceed one year and was to be continuous.¹

When this plan came before the Supreme Council Mr. Lloyd George was away in London, and Mr. Balfour asked that consideration might be postponed in order to allow him to consult the British military advisers, an indication that there were difficulties in accepting it. When it was brought forward again on the British Prime Minister's return he put forward an alternative scheme based on the following principles:—

1. That the German Army should be raised entirely by voluntary service.
2. That the minimum period of service for all ranks should be twelve years with the colours.
3. That the strength of the German Army should not exceed 250,000 men of all ranks organized in not more than fifteen divisions and five divisions of cavalry.²

On Marshal Foch's plan, he said, the total length of service being restricted to one year, 200,000 men would be recruited and trained annually, so that in ten years 2,000,000 men would have been trained, in fifteen years 3,000,000 men and in twenty years 4,000,000 men. To this Foch answered that soldiers of a sort would be produced by renewing the personnel annually, but that it was not the private soldier but the cadres which were important: a small standing army represented ready-made cadres for the training of a vast force.

Mr. Lloyd George countered this by pointing out that Germany had plenty of trained officers and would have them for the next twenty-five years. Foch replied that the Allies had to deal both with the present situation and with a future situation. It was true that

¹ David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. i, pp. 589 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

Germany had very large numbers of trained officers and men, but those now demobilized would in three or four years be of little value. Germany owed her great strength before the war to the large body of 120,000 professional non-commissioned officers. Under his scheme that backbone of the army would be broken, but if Germany were to be allowed a permanent standing army of over 40,000 or 50,000 men that would mean 40,000 or 50,000 possible non-commissioned officers available for training large cadres. Mr. Lloyd George answered that the old officers and non-commissioned officers who had returned to the colours on the outbreak of war had enabled Great Britain to train her new armies, and that a similar state of affairs would exist in Germany for many years to come. He thought that history would be repeating itself and that the Allies would be doing exactly the same thing as Napoleon had done after Jena. The annual renewal of the whole army, as suggested, merely meant in the course of years the creation of an enormous army. He insisted that this was a political question to be decided by the statesmen. Having obtained the support of the United States for his plan, he stated that the British Government was determined to prevent Germany from re-creating large armies, and the British representatives would never sign a treaty which would allow Germany to do this. On this Clemenceau gave way, but as a concession to Foch, who protested against Germany's being allowed a long-service army of 200,000, the size of the army was reduced to 100,000 with a corresponding reduction in armament.¹

So what had been thought to be a purely military problem was found to raise major political issues. Events have shown that Foch was right in his view as to the use Germany would make of a long service army. In due course it produced the officers and non-commissioned officers for S.S. and other semi-military formations, and thus provided the means for a rapid expansion of the army. Whether Foch's plan would have been more successful in preventing this is pure speculation; he had, as I have pointed out, no great faith in the possibility of preventing German rearmament. It remains to be seen whether, with the new resources with which air power has provided us, we can do better at the end of the present war.

The French had expressed anxiety as to the absorption by us into our navy of the German warships to be surrendered. Mr. Lloyd George removed these by declaring that he would agree to any distribution of the surrendered ships to which the Allies agreed and would sink those which fell to Great Britain's share. This removed the last difficulty and the naval and military terms were agreed, those to be imposed on our other enemies following the same principles as were to be applied to Germany.

While events arising out of the Armistice with Germany provided

¹ Foch: *L'Armistice et la Paix*, pp. 161 et seq.

the major problems for the Plenipotentiaries in Paris, some of the Armistices with our other enemies raised questions of great gravity. Those concluded with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were the consequences of what were, in effect, the unconditional surrender of these countries. The Armistice with Bulgaria created few difficulties. She was exhausted and anxious to secure the goodwill of the Allies, and therefore did her best to facilitate the movement of Allied troops through her country to the Danube, and this was the most immediate need of the Allies. That with Austria-Hungary was a much more complicated business, for it involved the break-up of an historic Empire and there was little recognition of the consequences of this in the conditions of armistice. It became more complicated on the secession of Hungary, which made it necessary to conclude a separate armistice with her. The other Allies, with their minds and resources fully occupied with the problems of Germany, left Austria very much to Italy and Italy had ambitions which clashed with those of Yugo-Slavia. The Armistice had been concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one side and Austria on the other and required the evacuation by Austria of all occupied territories; but no arrangements were made for occupation by the Allies in general, so that Italy was free to step in and peg out her claims. She jockeyed Yugo-Slavia out of Fiume, which had not been included in the Armistice, but had been occupied without authority from the Allies by a small Serbian force; and to prevent an imminent clash a small force composed of French, American and British detachments had to be sent there to make the occupation international. Italy also appointed a Governor of Dalmatia and attempted to set up an administration of that province. The position was not made easier by the fact that the Government of Yugo-Slavia was not yet recognized by the Allies, a fact of which Italy made the most. The result of this was great friction between Italy and Yugo-Slavia, which might have been reduced if more foresight had been exercised. Even if Allied troops other than Italians were scarce, it would not have been difficult to set up Allied Commissions of Control in the evacuated territories. Another serious defect in the post-Armistice arrangements made in Austria was that it was not realized that the conditions of the Armistice deprived the great city of Vienna of the major part of the hinterland on which she lived. Austria was reduced almost to the condition of being a head without a body. Arrangements for meeting these conditions by supplying foodstuffs and raw materials to Vienna were delayed far too long, and its large population suffered great privations which were in turn the cause of much unrest.

The Armistice with Hungary was more defective than that with Austria. It was made in a hurry to meet the unexpected situation caused by the setting up of a separate Government, and was a purely military arrangement between the Allied army which had advanced

through Bulgaria and Serbia to the Danube and the Hungarian military authorities. The only territorial arrangement concluded was to fix a line north of the frontier of Roumania and Serbia behind which the Hungarian forces were to withdraw. The western boundary of Hungary was marked by the frontier of Austria but the northern and eastern boundaries were not mentioned, and Czecho-Slovakia had claims stretching beyond the old northern frontier and Roumania beyond the eastern frontier. Before the Armistice with Hungary Roumania had re-entered the War and had invaded Transylvania. Later she followed this move by advancing up to and eventually well beyond the western limit of territory which had been allotted to her when she joined the Allies in August 1916. There was no mention of this territory in the Armistice nor were the Hungarians required to evacuate it, and the only way in which Roumania's action could be brought into agreement with the conditions of armistice was by applying Clause 3, which gave the Allies the right to occupy all places and strategic points fixed by the Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies; but this was stretching the clause far beyond what was intended when it was drafted. The consequence of this was that the boundary limiting Roumanian occupation had to be changed twice, and, as is usually the case when changes in armistice conditions detrimental to the defeated are made, except as punishment for an obvious breach of agreement, there was trouble. The Magyars disliked the Roumanians as heartily as the Yugo-Slavs disliked the Italians, and every change of line was regarded by them as portending a cession of their territory to an enemy whom they despised. The discontent which this procedure aroused spread over Hungary and there were threats of attack on the Roumanian troops. To prevent a clash, a proposal was laid before the Supreme Council in Paris for the establishment of a neutral zone, and after considerable discussion it was decided instead to fix a line of demarcation beyond which the Roumanian forces should not go. This line approximated closely to that of August 1916, and when the Hungarian Government was informed of it the Premier, Count Karolyi, resigned and a Government of the extreme left was formed. This led directly to a Bolshevik revolution under the leadership of Béla Kun.

About the same time as the Roumanians began their advance westwards into Transylvania the Czechs moved southwards to the middle Danube and occupied Pressburg, and further east they occupied the southern frontier of Slovakia on the edge of the Hungarian plain. These encroachments on Hungarian territory stirred the national spirit of the Magyars and a large number of officers of the old imperial army were willing to serve under the Red flag in order to turn out the invaders. An Allied Mission went to Hungary in April but failed to obtain a settlement, and early in May

the Red Hungarian Army attacked the Czechs. The new government of Czecho-Slovakia had not had time to organize and equip an army, a large number of its old soldiers were prisoners of war who had not yet been repatriated, and the Czechs were unable to oppose the Hungarians effectively.

A plan was prepared by the Military Representatives for joint action against Béla Kun by the considerable forces of the Allies which surrounded Hungary, but it was known to the Supreme Council that Béla Kun was in close communication with Lenin and it was feared that military action in Hungary might have widespread reactions, so no decision was taken. This had no evil results except that it did not improve the prestige of the Allies, for the supply services of the Hungarian Army broke down, largely owing to the disturbed state of the country produced by the revolution, and by the middle of June it was induced to withdraw behind the lines of demarcation on the northern and eastern boundaries which had been fixed in Paris.

I have already dealt with the sad story of the events which followed on the Armistice with Turkey, while the difficulties which arose in and on the borders of Russia were the consequence of the Russian revolution and did not arise out of any armistice, so that, though they added very materially to the burden borne by the statesmen in Paris, they are not germane to my argument, which is concerned with the importance of timely consideration by Allies of the conditions of armistices and of timely preparation for the restoration of order and normal life in the period which must elapse between the signature of armistices and the signature of peace treaties.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

THE comments which have been made in the previous chapters are wisdom after the event. There was no precedent to guide the Allies in the handling of the situation which followed on the cessation of hostilities in 1918. The surrender of Napoleon in 1814 left no such hell-broth of disturbance and discontent. It is, then, natural that the nature and extent of the problems created by more than four years of bitter struggle between nations in arms should not have been foreseen and that mistakes should have been made. Now we have experience from which we should profit when the 'cease fire' sounds in the present war. The conclusions to be drawn from that experience are, I think, obvious, but it will be convenient to summarize them.

The first is that a request for an armistice may come as unexpectedly as any event in war. Such a request is very different from proposals for a peace of accommodation. In total war it is tantamount to surrender, and this is peculiarly the case in the Germany of to-day, for the Nazi party is well aware that its existence depends on victory and that it cannot hope for terms which will allow it to survive. As Foch pointed out in 1918, the probability is that at the end of a prolonged war the victors are almost as exhausted as the vanquished and that any prospect of peace on reasonable terms will be hailed with universal relief by them. Further, once it is known that proposals for the cessation of hostilities are afoot men cannot be expected to continue to sacrifice their lives. For these reasons there will almost certainly be great pressure of opinion in favour of answering a request for an armistice quickly. As I have shown, omissions and commissions in terms of armistice may have far-reaching effects. They raise both political and military problems. It is not sufficient that they should impose on the enemy such conditions as will make it impossible for him to continue the struggle. They should envisage and make provision for a period, probably protracted, between the signing of armistices and the ratification of treaties of peace, a period in which each of the Allies will have grave problems of its own which will distract its attention from the major problems of world settlement, a period in which the reaction from a life of danger and effort will probably produce reactions more widespread and dangerous than occurred in 1919. As I have pointed out, attempts to rectify omissions in the original forms of an armistice by imposing additional terms lead to difficulties, except when they are the penalty for a clear and unpardonable breach of a direct

agreement. It follows that foresight and preparation are necessary if terms of armistice are to be satisfactory, and this preparation should include arrangements for the effective occupation of enemy territory until satisfactory conditions of peace are assured.

There are obvious difficulties in arranging for this in an Alliance which extends literally from China to Peru, but these difficulties are not insuperable. A general agreement on war aims has already been reached, and the same methods should make possible agreements on the application of the principles of war aims to specific problems. It may be said that it is not possible to prepare terms of armistice before the conditions prevailing when a request for an armistice comes in are known. That is not the case; there should be no great difficulty in preparing projects for armistices with our several enemies, varying from the terms which the Allies would impose if they were free to do as they wished to the minimum terms which they would accept. Preparation of this kind would facilitate quick decisions when the need for them arises, but quick decisions made without preparation would be unlikely to provide for the many contingencies which might arise.


The second conclusion is that, since armistices are suspensions of hostilities and peace does not come until treaties of peace are ratified, the Allies must maintain for an indefinite period the power to enforce their will on their enemies. If disturbance and unrest are to be avoided on the conclusion of hostilities, this fact should be made clear to the public and to the men and women serving in the forces of the several Allies. It is also important that an early decision should be reached as to the size and distribution of the forces which the Allies should maintain. It is improbable that it will be necessary to keep in the field the whole of the armed strength which the Allies needed to defeat the enemy, but it is certain that we in Great Britain shall not be able to produce the armed force required without retaining compulsory service for a period the length of which cannot be foreseen. A programme should therefore be prepared for the gradual reduction of our forces and announced to the Services at the earliest possible date, and no political or private interests should be allowed to interfere in the orderly execution of this programme.

The third conclusion is that the preparation of terms of armistice, the supervision of the execution of these terms, and the solution of the many and varied problems which will arise after the signature of the armistice raise questions different in nature and kind from those which are raised by the preparation of treaties of peace. Two separate examinations are therefore necessary. For the first of these we have a valuable precedent in the Supreme War Council of the last war. This body was to provide co-ordination of Allied policy and strategy, and its staff was at first purely military. But it soon became apparent that it had to deal with other than military questions and other

organizations were added to or connected with it. At the end of hostilities in the present war the Supreme War Council should be equipped from the first to deal with all matters requiring decision other than those concerning the treaties of peace. Such matters are the preparation of terms of armistice, renewals of armistices as may be necessary, supervision of the execution of terms of armistice, penalties to be imposed in the event of failure to comply with those terms, supervision and control of armies of occupation, administration of occupied districts, the restoration of communications by land, sea and air, provision of transport facilities, provision of food-stuffs and raw materials to countries which have been devastated by the enemy and to enemy countries, health services and the prevention of epidemics. Some such organization will be needed as the following:—

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

SECRETARIAT



The geographical position of the Allies in the present war makes it difficult to set up such an organization during the course of the war, but a nucleus should be in being in time to make preliminary studies of the problems which will arise so that the complete organization may get to work promptly. For this it is necessary that each of the Allies should have formulated its plans and views and that these separate plans should be brought together and agreed in the same way as agreement has been reached in war aims. Owing to the nature of the present war it may be advisable to have two Supreme War Councils, one to deal with the problems of the Pacific and the Far East, the other with the rest of the world. The major decisions both on the Supreme War Council and on the body charged with the preparation of peace treaties must be taken by the heads of the Allied States, but the number of occasions when decisions on policy are required from the Supreme War Council should not be numerous and, if the groundwork is soundly prepared by a well-equipped organization, decisions should be reached without much delay and the general supervision of the work of the Supreme War Council could be left to deputies of the heads of States. The fact that the control of both bodies must be in the hands of the Allied Plenipotentiaries should secure agreement as to policy in both.

The fourth conclusion is that, since no attempt to impose limitation of armaments on a defeated foe, either by terms of armistice or of treaty, has ever succeeded for a longer period than that within which the penalties of evasion were obvious, the Allies must, if they are to secure their declared war aims of disarming the aggressors, provide themselves with the necessary means. No victors are likely to endure the burden of maintaining armies of occupation for an indefinite period, and after a time the demands for relief from war taxation and for the return of men to industry will probably become irresistible. It is therefore important that the Allies should, at an early date, come to an agreement as to the nature and size of the force required to obtain the fulfilment of their war aims. The occupation of enemy territory by ground forces for a considerable period is essential, but this cannot be permanent. I have suggested elsewhere that air power may provide a solution which has not hitherto been possible. The increased and increasing power and range of aircraft make them very formidable weapons, particularly against an enemy who is not similarly equipped, while if suitably placed air bases, adequately guarded, are provided, the mobility and flexibility of air power is much greater than that of naval or military power, and it can act more quickly. Contingents composed of aircraft provided by a number of Allies can be controlled and directed centrally more easily than can fleets and armies made up of Allied contingents. Further, an air force is cheaper to maintain and requires less man-power in proportion to the influence it can exert than an army or a navy, and as a police force it has the advantage, which the other Services do not possess, of being able in the event of disturbance or threat of disturbance to deliver an effective visible warning on the spot before taking action. I suggest therefore that it should be our object to deprive our enemies of all aircraft, military or civil, and to control their disarmament by an Allied air force, until such time as more permanent arrangements for the prevention of aggression can be established.

Since the end of the last war a number of proposals for the establishment of an international police force have been made. Events have shown that reason and goodwill do not suffice to maintain peace and to secure respect for the decisions of an international authority. The case for equipping any international authority which may be established with power controlled directly by it has been strengthened, for general agreements to come to the aid of a victim of aggression made by the powers composing the international authority have proved to be insufficient as a deterrent from war. The difficulties in the way of creating and maintaining an international army of the size necessary to make its action, or threat of action, effective, have been fully explained,¹ and the

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 528 et seq.

advocates of an international police force composed of land forces have never been able to convince either governments or public that these difficulties can be overcome. But the same difficulties do not arise, for the reasons given above, in the case of an international police force composed of contingents of the air forces of the Powers, members of the international authority. The experiment of using such a force to control our enemies can be tried out in the interval between the signature of armistices and the ratification of treaties of peace, and if this experiment is successful it can then be made a part of a permanent organization for the preservation of world peace.

APPENDICES

I

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH BULGARIA

Signed 29 September 1918

I.—Immediate evacuation, in conformity with an arrangement to be concluded, of the territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia. There shall be removed from these territories neither cattle, grain, nor stores of any kind. No damage shall be done on departure. The Bulgarian Administration shall continue to exercise its functions in the parts of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

II.—Immediate demobilization of all Bulgarian armies, save for the maintenance on a war footing of a group of all arms, comprising three divisions of sixteen battalions each and four regiments of cavalry, which shall be thus disposed: two divisions for the defence of the Eastern frontier of Bulgaria and of the Dobrudja, and the 148th Division for the protection of the railways.

III.—Deposit, at points to be indicated by the High Command of the Armies of the East, of the arms, ammunition, and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized units which shall thereafter be stored by the Bulgarian authorities, under the control of the Allies.

The horses likewise will be handed over to the Allies.

IV.—Restoration to Greece of the material of the IVth Greek Army Corps, which was taken from the Greek army at the time of the occupation of Eastern Macedonia, in so far as it has not been sent to Germany.

V.—The units of the Bulgarian troops at the present time west of the meridian of Uskub, and belonging to the XIth German Army, shall lay down their arms and shall be considered until further notice to be prisoners of war. The officers shall retain their arms.

VI.—Employment by the Allied Armies of Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East until the conclusion of peace, without reciprocity as regards Allied prisoners of war. These latter shall be handed over without delay to the Allied authorities, and deported civilians shall be entirely free to return to their homes.

VII.—Germany and Austria-Hungary shall have a period of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations. Within the same period the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as also their nationals, must leave the territory of the

Kingdom. Orders for the cessation of hostilities shall be given by the signatories of the present convention.

(Signed) General FRANCHET D'ESPEREY
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEF
E. T. LOUKOF

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
September 29, 1918, 10.50 p.m.

II

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH TURKEY

Signed 30 October 1918

I.—Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles, and Bosphorus forts.

II.—Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

III.—All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

IV.—All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

V.—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.)

VI.—Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey; these ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

VII.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

VIII.—Free use by the Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

IX.—Use of all ship-repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

X.—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

XI.—Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from North-west Persia to behind the pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

XII.—Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

XIII.—Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.

XIV.—Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

XV.—Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Trans-Caucasian Railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

XVI.—Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied Commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cicilia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause V.

XVII.—Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

XVIII.—Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

XIX.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from the Turkish dominions; those in remote districts to be evacuated as soon after as may be possible.

XX.—The compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under Clause V.

XXI.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This

representative is to be furnished with all information necessary for this purpose.

XXII.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners over military age to be considered.

XXIII.—Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

XXIV.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

XXV.—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October, 1918.

Signed in duplicate on board His Britannic Majesty's Ship *Agamemnon*, at Port Mudros, Lemnos, the 30th October, 1918.

(Signed) ARTHUR CALTHORPE
HUSSEIN RAOUF
RECHAD HIKMET
SAADULLAH

III

PROTOCOL OF THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Signed 3 November 1918

A.—Military Clauses

I.—Immediate cessation of hostilities on land, by sea, and in the air.

II.—Complete demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of all units operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

There shall only be maintained in Austro-Hungarian territory, within the limits indicated below in Par. 3, as Austro-Hungarian military forces, a maximum of 20 Divisions reduced to their pre-war peace effective strength.

Half the total quantity of Divisional artillery, Army Corps artillery, as well as their respective equipment, beginning with all such material which is within the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian Army, shall be concentrated within localities to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, for the purpose of being surrendered to them.

III.—Evacuation of all territory invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war, and withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian

forces, within a space of time to be laid down by the Generals Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied forces on the different fronts, beyond a line fixed as follows:

From Piz Umbrail as far as the North of the Stelvio, it will follow the crest of the Rhaetian Alps as far as the sources of the Adige and of the Eisach, passing then by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and on the heights of the Oetz and the Ziller.

The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach as far as present frontier of Carnic Alps. It follows this line as far as Mount Tarvis, thence to watershed of Julian Alps by Col de Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terloug) and watershed Podberdo, Podlanscam and Idria. From this point the line turns south-east towards the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save river and its tributaries; from Schneeberg it descends the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca in evacuated territories.

It will follow the administrative limits of present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tridania and to the south, territory limited by a line from the shore of Cape Planka to the summits of watershed eastwards so as to include in evacuated area all the valleys and watercourses flowing towards Sebenico, such as Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo Scherda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura islands, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant'Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzolä, Cazza and Lagosta as well as neighbouring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of great and small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by Allied and American troops.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left *in situ*, and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by Commander-in-Chief of forces of Associated Powers on different fronts.

No new destruction, pillage or requisition by enemy troops in territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by Associated Powers.

IV.—Allied Armies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory which shall be necessary.

Armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have right of requisition on payment for troops of Associated Powers wherever they may be.

V.—Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days

not only from Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary before that date.

VI.—Administration of evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will provisionally be entrusted to local authorities under control of the Allied and associated armies of occupation.

VII.—Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war and interned Allied subjects and of civilian populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by Commanders-in-Chief of forces of Allied Powers on various fronts.

VIII.—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with medical material required.

B.—*Naval Conditions*

I.—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that free navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

II.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between years 1910 and 1918 and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under supervision of the Allies.

III.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 1 mine-layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off, completely disarmed and placed under supervision of Allies and United States of America.

IV.—Free navigation to all warships and merchant ships of Allied and Associated Powers to be given in Adriatic, in territorial waters and up River Danube and its tributaries, and Austro-Hungarian territory.

Allies and Associated Powers shall have right to sweep up all minefields and obstructions, and positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to ensure free navigation on the Danube, Allies and United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defence works.

V.—Existing blockade conditions set up by Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture with the exceptions which may be made by a Commission nominated by Allies and United States.

VI.—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by Allies and United States of America.

VII.—Evacuation of all the Italian coast, and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

VIII.—Occupation by Allies and United States of America of land and sea fortifications and islands which form defences, and of dockyards and arsenals at Pola.

IX.—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to Allies and Associated Powers to be returned.

X.—No destruction of ships or of material to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

XI.—All naval and mercantile prisoners of war of Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, signify their approval of above conditions.

3rd November 1918
*Representatives of Italian Supreme
Command:*

•Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO
Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI
Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI
Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA
Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA
Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI
Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI

IV

TEXT OF MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND HUNGARY

Signed at Belgrade, 13 November 1918

MILITARY CONVENTION REGULATING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE ARMISTICE, SIGNED BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, IS TO BE APPLIED IN HUNGARY.

1.—The Hungarian Government will withdraw all troops north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Bistritz, Maros-Vasarhely, the river Maros to its junction with the Theiss, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Fünfkirchen (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia.

The evacuation to be carried out in 8 days, the Allies to be entitled to occupy the evacuated territory on the conditions laid down by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Civil Administration will remain in the hands of the Government.

In actual fact only the police and gendarmerie will be retained in the evacuated zone, being indispensable to the maintenance of order, and also such men as are required to ensure the safety of the railways.

2.—Demobilization of Hungarian naval and military forces. An exception will be made in the case of six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order and in the case of small sections of police mentioned in paragraph 1.

3.—The Allies to have the right of occupying all places and strategic points, which may be permanently fixed by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The Allied troops to be allowed to pass through, or to remain in any part of Hungary.

The Allies to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock and shipping belonging to the State or to private individuals resident in Hungary, also of all draught animals.

4.—The rolling stock and railway staff usually employed in the occupied territory will remain (*see* paragraph 1), and a reserve of 2,000 wagons and 100 locomotives (normal gauge), and 600 wagons and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge), will also be handed over within the month to the General Commander-in-Chief. These will be for the use of the Allied troops, and to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. Some portion of this material could be levied from Austria. The figures are approximate.

5.—The ships and crews usually employed in the service of the occupied territory will remain, in addition all monitors will be surrendered to the Allies immediately at Belgrade. The rest of the Danube flotilla will be assembled in one of the Danube ports, to be appointed later by the General Commander-in-Chief, and will be disarmed there. A levy of 10 passenger vessels, 10 tugs, and 60 lighters will be made on this flotilla as soon as possible for the use of the Allied troops, to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia, due to the war. The figures are approximate.

6.—Within 15 days a detachment of 3,000 men from the railway technical troops are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief supplied with the material necessary to repair the Serbian railways. These figures are approximate.

7.—Within 15 days a detachment of sappers of the Telegraph branch are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief provided with material necessary for establishing telegraphic and telephone communications with Serbia.

8.—Within one month, 25,000 horses are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief, together with such transport material as he may deem necessary. These figures are approximate.

9.—Arms and war material to be deposited at places appointed by the General Commander-in-Chief. A portion of this material will be levied for the purpose of supplying units to be placed under the orders of the General Commander-in-Chief.

10.—Immediate liberation of all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, who will be collected at places convenient for their despatch by rail; they will there receive directions as to time and place of repatriation, according to the orders issued by the General Commander-in-Chief. Hungarian prisoners of war to be provisionally retained.

11.—A delay of 15 days is granted for the passage of German troops through Hungary and their quartering meanwhile, dating from the signing of the Armistice by General Diaz (4th November, 3 p.m.). Postal and telegraphic communication with Germany will only be permitted under the military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government undertakes to allow no military telegraphic communication with Germany.

12.—Hungary will facilitate the supplying of the Allied troops of occupation; requisitions will be allowed on condition that they are not arbitrary, and that they are paid for at current rates.

13.—The situation of all Austro-Hungarian mines in the Danube and the Black Sea must be communicated immediately to the

General Commander-in-Chief. Further, the Hungarian Government undertakes to stop the passage of all floating mines sown in the Danube up stream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian waters.

14.—The Hungarian postal service, telegraphs, telephones and railways will be placed under Allied control.

15.—An Allied representative will be attached to the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests.

16.—Hungary is under an obligation to cease all relations with Germany and stringently to forbid the passage of German troops to Roumania.

17.—The Allies shall not interfere with the internal administration of affairs in Hungary.

18.—Hostilities between Hungary and the Allies are at an end.

Two copies made 13th November, 1918, at 11.15 p.m. at Belgrade.

Signed for the Allies by the delegates of the General Commander-in-Chief.

VOIVODE MISHITCH
GENERAL HENRYS

Signed for Hungary by the delegate of the Hungarian Government.

BÉLA LINDER

V

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY¹

Signed 11 November 1918

(TRANSLATION)

BETWEEN Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, in conjunction with Admiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord, of the one part; and Secretary of State Erzberger, President of the German Delegation, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberndorff, Major-General von Winterfeldt, Captain Vanselow (German Navy), furnished with full powers in due form and acting with the approval of the German Chancellor, of the other part;

An Armistice has been concluded on the following conditions:

CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH GERMANY

A.—*On the Western Front*

I.—Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signature of the Armistice.

¹ The French version is the official text of the Armistice.

II.—Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries:—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, so ordered as to be completed within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice. German troops which have not evacuated the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will be made prisoners of war. Joint occupation by the Allied and United States forces shall keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation or occupation shall be regulated in accordance with a Note (Annexe No. 1), drawn up at the time of signature of the Armistice.

III.—Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or convicted).

IV.—Surrender in good condition by the German Armies of the following war material:

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field).

25,000 machine-guns.

3,000 trench mortars.

1,700 fighting and bombing aeroplanes—in the first place, all D7's and all night-bombing aeroplanes.

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

V.—Evacuation by the German Armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States Armies of Occupation.

The occupation of these territories by Allied and United States troops shall be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridge-heads at these points of a 30-kilometre (about 19 miles) radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the area.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine, between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river and 10 kilometres (6 and a quarter miles) distant from them, between the Dutch frontier and the Swiss frontier.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (right and left banks) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the Armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated according to the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

VI.—In all territories evacuated by the enemy, evacuation of the inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the Armistice.

No destruction of any kind to be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores, food, munitions and equipment, which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general character shall be taken, and no official order shall be given which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

VII.—Roads and means of communications of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in Annexe No. 2 (not exceeding 31 days in all).

5,000 motor lorries are also to be delivered in good condition within 36 days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days, together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system.

Further, the necessary working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals and repair shops shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany, so far as the working of the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine is concerned.

All lighters taken from the Allies shall be restored to them.

The note (Annexe 1) defines the details of these measures.

VIII.—The German Command shall be responsible for revealing within 48 hours after the signing of the Armistice, all mines or delay-action fuses disposed on territories evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.

The German Command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of wells, springs, etc.)

Breaches of these clauses will involve reprisals.

IX.—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories save for settlement of accounts with authorised persons.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

X.—The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including those under trial and condemned. The Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they think fit. This condition annuls all other conventions regarding prisoners of war, including that of July 1918, now being ratified. However, the return of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries.

XI.—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who shall be left on the spot with the material required.

B.—Clauses relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany

XII.—All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 1st August, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia, must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

XIII.—Evacuation of German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners and agents, civilian as well as military, now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as defined on 1st August, 1914), to be recalled.

XIV.—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measures with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as defined on 1st August, 1914).

XV.—Annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

XVI.—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

C.—*Clause relating to East Africa*

XVII.—Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period specified by the Allies.

D.—*General Clauses*

XVIII.—Repatriation without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians, including hostages and persons under trial and condemned, who may be subjects of Allied or Associated States other than those mentioned in Clause III.

XIX.—*Financial Clauses*

With the reservation that any subsequent concessions and claims by the Allies and United States remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are imposed:

Reparation for damage done.

While the Armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies to cover reparation for war losses.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power.

This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until peace is concluded.

E.—*Naval Conditions*

XX.—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the position and movements of all German ships.

Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the Navies and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

XXI.—All Naval and Mercantile Marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

XXII.—To surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and mine-layers), with armament and equipment complete. Those that cannot put to sea shall be deprived of armament and equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall

be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of a wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this Article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the Armistice.

XXIII.—The following German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only care and maintenance parties being left on board, namely:

6 battle cruisers.

10 battleships.

8 light cruisers (including two minelayers).

50 destroyers of the most modern type.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German Naval bases, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the Auxiliary Fleet are to be disarmed. All vessels specified for internment shall be ready to leave German ports seven days after the signing of the Armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

XXIV.—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all minefields and destroy all obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the position of these are to be indicated.

XXV.—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the Navies and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. This to be secured by the occupation of all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defence works of all kinds in all the routes from the Kattegat into the Baltic, and by the sweeping up and destruction of all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any questions of neutrality being raised by Germany, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated, and the plans relating thereto are to be supplied.

XXVI.—The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice as shall be found necessary.

XXVII.—All Aerial Forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

XXVIII.—In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon, *in situ* and intact, the port material and material for inland waterways, also all merchant ships, tugs and lighters, all Naval aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

XXIX.—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized in the Black Sea are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned, and German materials as specified in Clause XXVIII are to be abandoned.

XXX.—All merchant ships at present in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored to ports specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

XXXI.—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

XXXII.—The German Government shall formally notify all the neutral Governments, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately cancelled.

XXXIII.—No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the Armistice.

F.—*Duration of Armistice*

XXXIV.—The duration of the Armistice is to be 36 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the Armistice may be repudiated by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that failure to execute Articles III and XVIII completely in the periods specified is not to give reason for a repudiation of the Armistice, save where such failure is due to malice aforethought.

To ensure the execution of the present convention under the most favourable conditions, the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission is recognized. This Commission shall act under the supreme authority of the High Command, military and naval, of the Allied Armies.

The present Armistice was signed on the 11th day of November 1918, at 5 o'clock a.m. (French time).

(Signed) F. FOCH

R. E. WEMYSS

ERZBERGER

OBERNDORFF

WINTERFELDT

VANSELOW

11th November 1918.

The representatives of the Allies declare that, in view of fresh events, it appears necessary to them that the following condition shall be added to the clauses of the Armistice:

'In case the German ships are not handed over within the periods specified, the Governments of the Allies and of the United States shall have the right to occupy Heligoland to ensure their delivery.'

(Signed) R. E. WEMYSS, *Admiral*

F. FOCH

The German delegates declared that they will forward this declaration to the German Chancellor, with the recommendation that it be accepted, accompanying it with the reasons by which the Allies have been actuated in making this demand.

(Signed) ERZBERGER

OBERNDORFF

WINTERFELDT

VANSELOW

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
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